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ARTICLES
Deconstructing' Constructive Discharge:
The Misapplication of Constructive Discharge
Standards in Employment
Discrimination Remedies
Mark S. Kende*
INTRODUCTION
Two federal courts ruled that Gail Derr was discriminatorily demoted
because of her sex when her employer moved her from a lease analyst posi-
tion to a cleical job.2 Her superior had criticized her for working despite
having two children 3 and had told her that women with too much educa-
tion create problems.4 Yet Gail could recover nothing for her injuries.5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that her resignation
from the clerical job, although motivated by her desire to escape continu-
ing discrimination, could well cut off her right to recover back pay and
other relief.6 Such a resignation will cut off a discrimination victim's right
* Associate Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School; BA, Yale University; J.D.,
University of Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professors Justin Brooks, Mary Phelan,
and Steve Sheppard for their valuable comments and suggestions. I would also like to thankJane
Siegel, Stephen Weizenecker, and Katherine Talbot for their research assistance.
1 Deconstruction is a philosophical theory that originated with the French postmodernist
philosopher, Jacques Derrida, and has developed into a leading method of literary criticism. See
generally Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theoy, Statutory
Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38 KAN. L. REv. 815, 821-33 (1990); Ben Yagoda, Retooling
Critical Theoy: Buddy, Can You Paradigm , N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 4, 1994, § 4 (Week in Review Desk), at
6.
Deconstructionists take the ordinary interpretation of a text and expose the unrecognized
assumptions which underlie that interpretation in an effort to demonstrate that these
assumptions are social constructs, not universally accepted principles. Schanck, supra, at 823.
These assumptions therefore often favor powerful societal interests. Id. at 824. The first legal
academics who used this method to examine judicial decisions and statutory interpretation were
adherents of the Critical Legal Studies movement. Id.
More recently, deconstruction has been defined in an informal and popular manner as
encompassing "any undermining of an accepted or orthodox notion." Id. at 822 n.38 (citingJoan
C. Williams, Deconstruding Gender, 87 MICH. L. Ray. 797 (1989)). As Professor Schanck points out,
"Deconstruction thus serves a critical ... function" above all. Id. at 821; see also CAss R. SurNsTEIN,
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 191 (1990); Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting
Indeterminacy With One Bold Though4 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 113 (1990).
This Article critically examines court decisions that have relied on constructive discharge
principles to cut off the back pay of discrimination victims.
2 Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 341 (10th Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit affirmed a
district court ruling that Ms. Derr's employer had discriminated against her. Id. at 342.
3 Id. at 341-42.
4 Id. at 342.
5 Id. at 344.
6 Id. at 342. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimi-
nation on account of race, religion, sex, or national origin, expressly provides for lost back pay
and reinstatement as remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1) (1988) (providing that the court may
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to relief unless the victim was constructively discharged. 7 Gail's company
therefore may have benefitted by continuing to discriminate since her de-
parture could reduce its damage payments.8
.Many federal appellate courts have denied relief to employees who
have been discriminatorily demoted, transferred, or denied a promotion,
by ruling that the employee's subsequent resignation from the discrimina-
tory circumstances barred the award of damages for back pay.9 Like the
Tenth Circuit, these courts have granted relief only when the employee has
been constructively discharged-treated so intolerably that any reasonable
person would have felt compelled to quit.' 0 Most discriminatory demo-
tions or promotion denials, however, are not accompanied by such ex-
treme conditions. 1 This constructive discharge rule therefore requires
order "reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay"). The U.S. Supreme
Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), ruled that courts should routinely
award back pay as a remedy in Title VII cases to further the statute's purpose of making discrimi-
nation victims whole. See infra note 29.
7 Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342 (10th Cir. 1986). One oddity of Derr is that the
only damages that the plaintiff would have received, had she not resigned, would have covered a
period a few years after she had been discriminatorily demoted. Since she resigned prior to this
period, the court's ruling that her resignation might cut off her right to recover back pay could
leave her with zero damages.
8 As this Article later argues, companies may even gear their discrimination to be severe
enough to cause the employee, who has already been discriminatorily demoted or denied a pro-
motion, to quit, without making it so intolerable that it constitutes a constructive discharge. See
infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. At a recent conference held by the ABA Section of
Labor & Employment Law, a lawyer representing the employer perspective acknowledged at a
session on constructive discharge situations that "from an employer's standpoint, it may be bene-
ficial if the complaining party is no longer in the workforce, especially if there is ongoing litiga-
tion." Summary of Proceedings, 2 ABA EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMrrrE NEWSL, at 1, 9 (1994 Mid-
Winter Meeting) [hereinafter Summary of Proceedings).
9 See, e.g., Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Martin W. O'Toole, Note,
Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in Title VlfLitigation, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 587, 587 n.4
(1986) ("[An employer may be liable for a discriminatory act, e.g., passing a woman over for a
promotion on account of her sex. But if the employee cannot also show that her subsequent
resignation amounted to a constructive discharge, then her employer's liability for back pay ter-
minates on the date of her resignation."); infra notes 72-78 (listing cases) and accompanying text.
A minority of courts, however, do not necessarily require the plaintiff to stay put in order to
continue receiving back pay. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984); see infra notes 55-
61 and accompanying text (describing the constructive discharge standard as used by the federal
courts). The federal circuits, however, are fiercely divided on whether an employer must have
intended to force out an employee in order for there to be a constructive discharge. Sheila
Finnegan, Comment, Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the ADEA, 53 U. CHI. L Rav. 561,
562 (1986). Numerous articles have been written about this split. See, e.g., O'Toole, supra note 9.
However, it is merely a peripheral part of this Article.
11 The isolated discriminatory acts of most employers, such as the giving of unequal pay or an
ordinary demotion, do not constitute a constructive discharge. See, e.g., Pittman v. Hattiesburg
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981). Instead, the employer must create
"aggravated circumstances," such as giving the employee a severe demotion and forcing the em-
ployee to work with an alleged discriminator. See, e.g., Cazzola v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., 751
F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1984). But see Schafer v. Board of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 250 (3d Cir.
1990) (aggravating circumstances are not absolutely required to support constructive discharge
finding). See generally Richard M. DeAgazio, Note, Promoting Fairness: A Proposalfor a More Reason-
able Standard of Constructive Discharge in Title VII Denial of Promotion Cases, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
979, 994 (1992) (footnotes omitted) ("[Clourts generally hold that the 'mere fact of discrimina-
tion, without more, is insufficient to make out a claim of constructive discharge.' Thus, to prove
constructive discharge, the plaintiff must show 'aggravating factors' to make working conditions
'intolerable' to a reasonable employee." (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473
(D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds and remanded 490 U.S. 228 (1989))).
[Vol. 71:1
DECONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
employment discrimination victims to remain with their companies to stay
eligible for court-ordered relief.
These courts, however, do not use the constructive discharge ap-
proach to determine remedies in cases in which the employee was discrimi-
natorily discharged, rather than merely demoted or denied a promotion.
Instead, they follow the U.S. Supreme Court's suggestion in Ford Motor Co.
v. EEOC that mitigation of damages principles apply to actual discharge
cases.' 2 These principles require courts to award lost back pay to discrimi-
nation victims unless they have failed to use "reasonable diligence" in
searching for a "substantially equivalent" employment opportunity.'3
Under Ford Motor Co., a discriminatorily discharged employee may turn
down inferior job offers from other companies without having back pay
tolled, because such offers are not for substantially equivalent employment.
This freedom puts discharged employees in a very different situation than
victims of discriminatory demotions or promotion denials, such as Gail
Derr, who presumably must remain in an inferior placement to recover
back pay.14 That Title VII would yield such seemingly contradictory results
is odd.
Many federal courts apply constructive discharge principles because
they believe that employees who have been discriminatorily demoted,
transferred, or denied a promotion should stay and challenge the com-
pany's discrimination internally.15 These courts also do not want employ-
ees leaving at the smallest sign of discrimination and then suing for an
unjustified windfall.' 6 These policy concerns do not, of course, govern dis-
charged employees because such employees are no longer with the com-
pany that fired them; they cannot internally challenge the company's
actions.
12 458 U.S. 219 (1982). According to the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co., "An unemployed
or underemployed claimant, like all other Title VII claimants, is subject to the statutory duty to
minimize damages set out in § 706(g). This duty, rooted in an ancient principle of law, requires
the claimant to use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment." Id. at 231; see
also infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
13 Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231-32. Employees who are discriminatorily discharged are
therefore presumptively entitled to a remedy. See infra note 29.
14 Den- v. Gulf Oil Co., 796 F.2d 340, 342 (10th Cir. 1986).
15 As one commentary states, "[Tihe guidingprinciple behind the constructive discharge rule
is that discrimination should be attacked from within the existing employment relationship."
DeAgazio, supra note 11, at 994 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., EEOC v. Riss Int'l, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 425 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(stating that an employee "is not entitled to back pay for periods during which he voluntarily
remained in idleness" (quoting NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447, 452 (8th Cir. 1963)));
DeAgazio, supra note 11, at 1008 (footnotes omitted):
[I]f the sole issue was mitigation of damages, arguably every employee who was denied
any promotion-no matter how minor-would be entitled to postresignation relief, sub-
ject only to the employee's duty to mitigate.... [E]mployees would be permitted to
'quit at the first signs of discrimination'. and to receive postresignation relief
nonetheless.
Id.; Ira M. Saxe, Note, Constructive Discharge Under the ADEA: An Argument for the Intent Standard, 55
FORDHAM L REv. 963, 985 (1987) (footnotes omitted) ("[E]mployees should be discouraged
from resigning when doing so deprives the employer of the opportunity to limit its liability by
resolving the problems leading to the employee's resignation.").
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This Article examines the use of constructive discharge principles to
govern back pay awards in discrimination cases. It also looks at whether
using the mitigation of damages principles from Ford Motor Co. in all cases
would be more consistent with the purposes of Title VII than the construc-
tive discharge doctrine. These issues are important because most compa-
nies prefer not to fire employees.' 7 They fear lawsuits,' 8 demoralized co-
workers, 19 and employee violence.20 Thus, employers usually prefer to dis-
17 WILLIAM MORIN & LYLE YORKS, DISMISSAL 233 (1990):
Termination should be part of a progressive process of applying sanctions .... As im-
plied above, termination should be management's last recourse when other disciplinary
efforts have failed .... Other actions should initiate a progressive process in which the
supervisor first counsels the employee and then gives a series of warnings, perhaps even
time off from the job, before finally terminating the employee.
Id. (emphasis added); Glen M. Gomes &James F. Morgan, Meeting the WrongfulDischarge Challenge:
Legislative Options for Small Business, J. SMALL BUS. MGMT., April 1992, at 35, 35 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) ("This uncertain environment encourages increasing numbers of employees
to bring lawsuits alleging 'wrongful termination' ... .As a result, employers are less willing tofire even
the most unproductive workers. In other words, 'paranoia has replaced power.'"); Frank Greve, Fed-
eral Bosses Have Fear of Firing, Managers Find That There are Too Many Deterrents to Disciplining Civil
Servants, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 25, 1993, at IA ("Lots of federal supervisors... say firing
anyone has become so tricky and time-consuming and the repercussions so fearsome, that getting
tough simply doesn't pay."); Carol McHugh, Employers Struggle with Liability, Privacy Issues as wo-
lence Erupts in American Workplace CHI. DAILY L. BuLL-, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1 (emphasis added) (quot-
ing a Chicago lawyer's statement, "All I can say is that it is easier to deny employment to
somebody who does not yet have it, both in the public and private sector, than it is to take employ-
ment away from somebody who already has it.. ").
18 See Gomes & Morgan, supra note 17, at 35 (noting that employers are afraid to fire employ-
ees given the explosion of wrongful termination lawsuits); Fired Workers Get Suitable Revenge, Cm.
TRIB., Nov. 23, 1986, at 6B ("The flood of such suits has made companies more reluctant to
dismiss workers .... ."); McHugh, supra note 17;J. Craig Peyton, Firms Consider Litigation Risk; Work
Force Reductions, NAT'L L.J., May 13, 1991, at 29 (counseling that firms that must cut costs can
decrease the risk of litigation by careful planning, such as by trying to cut back in areas other
than in the work force).
New federal statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans With Disabilities
Act also add to employer fears because they provide employees with new causes of action and
with greater remedies against discrimination. Lisa A. Lavelle, Note, The Duty to Accommodate: Will
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities only to Disable Small
Businesses, 66 NOTRE DAME L. Ruv. 1135, 1135 (1991). Employees filed a record number of
employment discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in
1993. Record Number of Charges Filed in Fiscal Year 1993, FAIR EMPL. PRAC. SUMMARY (BNA) No. 2,
Jan. 31, 1994, at 9. Rather than fire employees outright, given these concerns, many firms cre-
ated "voluntary" exit incentives programs in an effort to persuade employees to resign or retire.
Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The
Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1273 n.8 (1993).
Some businesses refuse to hire employees in these newly protected categories given their
fears of lawsuits and having to make expensive accommodations for the special needs of these
employees. SeeJeanne Meserve, The Fear of the Cost of Discrimination Lawsuits (CNN News broad-
cast,July 27, 1994) (discussing employer concerns over hiring the disabled as the ADA extends to
cover businesses with only 15 employees). As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, many employ-
ers have required employees to sign arbitration agreements regarding employment disputes to
ensure that the employee cannot drag them into costily litigation. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
19 See, e.g., ROBERT COULSON, THE TERMINATION HANDBOOK at vii (1981) ("Firings are not
what most people like to think about or to talk about, certainly not something to be discussed
with the workers."); id. at 56 (explaining that there is so much guilt in firing because "[fleelings
play an important part in the working environment. People at work don't leave their emotions at
home. When an employee is being fired, those relationships come to the surface."); MORIN &
YoitS, supra note 17, at 15-16 ("[Aln important consideration is the reaction of the dismissed
manager's peers and associates. If they perceive the manager as a victim who has been treated
unfairly, morale can plummet and turnover increase. 'What does the future hold for me?' and
'Should I be looking elsewhere in self-defense?' are typical reactions among employees who have
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cipline or to demote an employee, perhaps in the hope that the employee
will become discouraged and quit, rather than to fire the employee out-
right.2 1 The issues are also timely because the U.S. Supreme Court in Mc-
Kennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.22 has recently decided a case
involving an employment discrimination victim's right to continue receiv-
ing back pay. This is the so-called after-acquired evidence case.
worked closely with a manager who has been fired.") (emphasis added); Charles Caulkins &
James J. McDonald, Jr., Lawyer Terminations: Increasingly the Subject of Employment Discrimination
Suits, FL.A. B.J., Feb. 1991, at 27, 27 (noting that "dismissal of unproductive lawyers may be a
painful experience"); Peyton, supra note 18 ("News of terminations may damage the firm's repu-
tation among potential recruits and rival firms.").
20 See, e.g., Roy Rivenburg, What Do You Do With a Worker Nobody Wants Around Anymore, But
One You Can't Fire?, LA TiMES, June 26, 1992, at El ("Executives at a Los Angeles electronics
company, for instance, are afraid to fire one manager who acts deranged at work and once held
his wife hostage at home. They're fearful he'll hunt down and shoot the CEO in retaliation.").
There have been several recent incidents involving workplace shootings by individuals who were
just fired, many of which were related to the U.S. Postal Service. Tia Schneider Deneberg & R. V.
Denenberg, The Future of the Workplace Dispute Resolver, 49 Disp. REsOL.J. 48 (1994). See also CouL-
SON, supra note 19, at 5 (relating the tragic story of a recently discharged employee who reacted
to his termination by killing his father and then killing several others by driving his car in a
reckless manner).
AJuly 1994 U.S. Department ofJustice report found that one in six violent crimes in the
United States happens at work, and that the workplace is the scene of almost one million violent
crimes every year. The report found that from 1987 to 1992 there was an average of 13,100 rapes,
79,100 robberies, 264,200 aggravated assaults, and 615,200 simple assaults per year at the work-
place. SeeAbout a Sixth of U.S. Crime is at Job Site, N.Y. TiMEs,July 25, 1994, atA10. A U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor study came up with similar results. See Crashes Top On-Job Danger: Accidents,
Homicides Lead Causes of Workplace Deaths, LANSING ST. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at 1. See also McHugh,
supra note 17, at 1 ("Employers today increasingly find themselves caught between the rising tide
of violence in the workplace and the privacy walls meant to shield individuals .... With homicide
now the leading cause of workplace fatalities for women and the third leading cause of workplace
deaths overall in the U.S., business owners and managers are vulnerable to suits asserting theories
of liability that range from negligent hiring to premises liability to federal tort claims."). Employ-
ers have also been found liable to employees for hiring or retaining people who commit violent
acts against the employees. Id.; see also Lori Mathews, Fear Transforms Office Layouts, Changes Include
Escape Routes, Panic Buttons, Drr. FREE PRESS, Sept. 23, 1994, at lB.
21 The large number of cases in which employees are discriminated against and then resign
demonstrates this workplace trend. See infra Part III and notes 71-78 & 83-88. The ABA's Section
on Labor & Employment Law devoted one of the workshops at its March 12, 1994 Mid-Winter
Meeting to "Constructive Discharge Claims: Employee and Employer Strategies in Personnel De-
cision-Making." See Summaiy of Proceedings, supra note 8, at 9.
As a former employment discrimination lawyer with the Chicago law firm of Davis, Miner,
Barnhill & Galland, my colleagues and I brought many of our cases on behalf of employees who
had quit their jobs after having been illegally demoted or denied a promotion. See, e.g., Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law at 5, Cotten v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 86-C-1578 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (settling
an age discrimination case at trial after plaintiff's evidence was presented; major issue was
whether plaintiff's refusal to accept a demotion from position of Vice-President and Regional
Director to job in defendant's newly created Private Capital department terminated plaintiff's
right to relief); Davis v. Commonwealth Edison, Ch. No. 1984 CN 1997, ALS No. 2718 (Ill. Hum.
Rts. Comm'n. Sept. 18, 1990) (interim recommended order and decision) (disability discrimina-
tion case in which Administrative LawJudge stated that plaintiff's refusal to accept demotion did
not cut off his right to a remedy because the refusal was consistent with plaintiffis duty to mitigate
damages); see also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 311-12 (E.D. Pa.
1991), reu'd on other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993):
That Ms. Ezold chose to leave Wolf, Block in an attempt to replenish and continue her
career was not a knee-jerk reaction to a one-time discriminatory act .... When Wolf,
Block unlawfully permitted gender to enter into its consideration of Ms. Ezold for part-
ner, she understandably came to the conclusion that her career at the Firm would be
limited ....
Id.
22 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
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This Article has five Parts. Part I describes the legal principles gov-
erning damages and back pay calculations under Title VII, including a dis-
crimination victim's statutory duty to mitigate.23 Part II analyzes the
federal courts' application of constructive discharge concepts in the reme-
dial context. Part III describes which federal and state courts use the con-
structive discharge approach to cut off the right of plaintiffs to back pay,
and which use mitigation or other analyses. Part III also demonstrates that
scholars who have previously addressed this issue are mistaken in assuming
that the federal courts have uniformly adopted the constructive discharge
approach. 24
Relying on several methods of statutory interpretation, Part IV shows
that, by forcing discrimination victims to endure continuing discrimina-
tion, the constructive discharge approach contravenes Title VI's purposes,
as well as those of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.25 Denying discrimination
23 This Article uses the term "discrimination victim" to refer to employees who resign after
being discriminatorily demoted, transferred, harassed, denied a promotion, etc. The term also
presumes that a court has found the employee to have been subject to illegal discrimination prior
to resigning.
Although the Article analyzes Titie VII, its conclusions are applicable to other antidiscrimina-
tion statutes such as the ADEA and the ADA. They certainly should apply to age discrimination
victims, as the ADEA remedies have historically been more generous to plaintiffs than the Tire
VII remedies. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (providing for reinstatement and back pay)
with 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) (ADEA) (providing for reinstatement and back pay, as well as
liquidated damages for willful violations). See infra note 29 (showing that the ADEA back pay
provision, unlike that of Title VII, contains mandatory language).
24 The major employment treatises include cases that embody this constructive discharge
approach. See infra note 70. Other experts in the area also assume that this approach is virtually
unanimous. See, e.g., Robert Fitzpatrick, Damages and Other Remedies in Employment Cases, AD-
VANCED EMPL LAW AND LITIGATION SEMINAR (AI-ABA Course of Study Materials, Washington
D.C.), December 2-4, 1993, at 17 ("The general rule is that voluntary termination of employment
after a discriminatory denial of promotion or transfer, etc., cuts off the right to damages. How-
ever, when the employee is constructively discharged, her termination will not cut off back pay
liability."); ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 375-76 (1992) ("With
respect to the discriminatory denial of promotion, these courts have held that a discriminatee has
an obligation, absent a constructive discharge, to remain in her current position to mitigate dam-
ages."); 3 Empl. Discrimination Coordinator (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan) Par. 43,946 -44,008.5
(1994). As this Article demonstrates, however, these experts are mistaken. The federal courts are
not all committed to the constructive discharge approach. See infra notes 83-84 & 87-94.
25 The employee is subjected to a continuing violation of the federal antidiscrimination laws
for as long as she is kept in an inferior position due to a discriminatory decision. See, e.g., DeA-
gazio, supra note 11, at 997 ("Hence,Jolly was placed into a Catch-22 position: if he remained, he
would be locked in an inferior position; if he resigned, he would risk becoming unemployed and
forfeiting a make-whole remedy."); see also infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
Title VII embodies the twin aims of deterring discrimination and making discrimination
victims whole. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) ("Congress...
ordained that its policy of outlawing [discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin] should have the 'highest priority'... ."); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1237-
38 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978):
Monetary awards exacted from employers who practice unlawful discrimination serve
two primary functions. First, the prospect of economic penalties ... certainly deters
illegal employment practice[s] .... Second, economic exactions recompense individu-
als for injuries inflicted by employers' discriminatory conduct. These prophylactic and
compensatory purposes are the basis of most recent anti-employment discrimination
legislation, including the ADEA and Title VII.
Id. Tide VII even seeks to have courts act against the discrimination quickly. See Clyde Summers,
Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457,
483 (1992) (noting that Title VII specifies that the judge shall assign the case for hearing "at the
earliest practicable date and ... cause the case to be in every way expedited" (citing 42 U.S.C.
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victims the option .of resigning is also inconsistent with Ford Motor Co.'s ad-
monition that employment discrimination victims should be free to reject
inferior job options, without violating their duty to mitigate damages. 26
Part V proposes a new balancing test based on mitigation standards for
courts to employ in deciding whether a discrimination victim's resignation
should cut off back pay. The test weighs the degree of continuing discrimi-
nation against the mitigation effort made by the plaintiff. The more egre-
gious the discrimination, the more freedom the victim should have to
resign without having her back pay cut off. When the discriminatory demo-
tion was not to a substantially inferior position, however, the employer may
be able to persuade the court to cut off back pay unless the employee re-
signed as part of a diligent effort to seek comparable employment. Finally,
Part V looks at possible objections to such a test.
I. BACK PAY AND MITIGATION OF DAMAGES UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT
DIsCRIMINATION STATUTES
Congress crafted the remedial provisions of the federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes to "make whole" the victims of discrimination. 27 The provi-
§ 2000e-5(f)(5) (1988))); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d), 633(b) (1988) (allowing plaintiffs to file
concurrently with the appropriate state and federal agencies in order to expedite the process);
Gonzalez v. Carlin, 907 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1990) (permitting magistrate trials to speed things up);
Morse v. Marsh, 656 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (same).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 made these statutory aims even clearer by strengthening the
remedies available to employment discrimination victims. In Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.,
31 F.3d 1221, 1235 n.23 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 1397
(1995), the Third Circuit stated:
One overriding lesson the 1991 Act tutors all but its most unmindful reader is that
Congress was unhappy with increasingly parsimonious constructions of Title VII. Essen-
tially, Congress forcefully reminded courts of the canon that Title VII and ADEA, as
remedial statutes, are to be construed liberally to promote their welfare purposes, equal-
ity of treatment and employment opportunities.
Id.
26 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982). Furthermore, courts that require the em-
ployee to stay put to be eligible for back pay cause the employee to turn down promising job
opportunities at other companies where there is no discrimination. This result is inconsistent
with Tide ViI's mitigation principles. In addition, requiring an employee to stay at the company
and fight discrimination from within amounts to an intra-company exhaustion of remedies provi-
sion. Yet no such provisions exist in the federal antidiscrimination laws. Title VII, the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act all require plaintiffs to
file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or with a state civil rights agency to commence a
discrimination lawsuit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), 2000e-5(f) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988);
42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. V 1993) (adopting the procedures of Title VII). The EEOC is supposed
to investigate the charge to determine if it has any merit. This requirement is not exhaustive,
however, because these statutes permit the plaintiff to cut off the administrative investigation
after a certain period and then to file a federal court lawsuit. These statutes have no intra-com-
pany exhaustion of grievance procedures. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 762
(1979); Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972); see also Scesa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp.
1126, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D. Conn.),
afJZ 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1985); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496
(1982) (rejecting an exhaustion requirement in § 1983 civil rights cases).
27 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975), the Supreme Court stated,
"The 'make whole' purpose of Title VII is made evident by the legislative history." The Court
elaborated by explaining that the statute was meant to provide "the most complete relief possi-
ble" to put the discrimination victim in the position that she would have been in but for the
discrimination. I&. at 421; see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) (adopting the remedial provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act to advance the "make whole" purpose).
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sions permit courts to award back pay, compensatory damages, and
injunctive relief, such as reinstatement. Title VII and the ADEA also give
courts the power to award punitive damages to punish and deter malicious
and willful discrimination. 28
Virtually all discrimination victims who lose wages and fringe benefits
are entitled to receive back pay to compensate for these losses.2 9 The back
pay period usually runs from the date of the discriminatory conduct until
the final court judgment.30 In simple cases, courts calculate back pay by
subtracting the actual earnings made by the employee from the wages and
fringe benefits that the employee would have received, had there been no
discrimination. 31
Determining what pay the plaintiff would have earned from the de-
fendant had there been no discrimination is a difficult part of any back pay
calculation. Courts often base that figure on the average earnings of the
defendant's employees who have job assignments and seniority similar to
what the plaintiff would have had, absent discrimination. 2 Expert testi-
mony projecting salaries or wages that the employee would have earned
28 Since its inception, the ADEA has included a liquidated damages provision that permits
plaintiffs who demonstrate that an employer's discrimination is willful to recover double dam-
ages. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added a punitive damages provi-
sion to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) (Supp. V 1993).
29 See, e.g., Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l Corp., 766 F.2d 788, 794 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1057 (1986); Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 626 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984); Walters v. City of Atlanta, 610 F. Supp. 715, 728 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(holding that a Title VII claimant is presumptively entitled to back pay), affd in par4 rev'd in par
803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986); JOEL FRIEDMAN & GEORGE STRICKLER, JR., ThE LAw OF EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION 652-53 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the leading cases showing that fringe ben-
efits are part of back pay awards, and also showing that federal courts generally award
prejudgment interest on the amounts of wages lost).
The ADEA states that "[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter
shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of
[section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act]: Provided, That liquidated damages shall be payable
only in cases of willful violations of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) (first emphasis ad-
ded). Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides in part that any violating employer
"shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988) (emphasis added). One of the few
exceptions is for an employer who was acting in accordance with state law when the discrimina-
tion occurred. See, e.g., Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 785 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1986); Le
Beau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 727 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1984). In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975), the Court rejected the argument that the employer should not be liable
for back pay absent a showing of bad faith.
30 Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1986). One problem arises
when the victim has endured a continuing violation, such as discriminatory pay rates, that has
occurred over many years but has only recently filed a discrimination charge. The question
presented by this situation is whether the victim can recover lost wages from the time of the first
act of discrimination or whether there is some limitation on going back in time that is connected
to when the discrimination charge was filed. Section 706 (g) of Title VII does contain such a
limitation, providing that "[black pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years
prior to the filing of the charge with the [EEOC]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988).
31 "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988). See NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 363 (1951).
32 See, e.g., Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 590 (N.D. Ala.
1979), affd, 631 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980).
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also may help.33 Any doubts regarding back pay projections must be re-
solved against the defendant wrongdoer, but pure speculation must be
avoided.3 4 Back pay calculation is further complicated by disagreements
between the federal courts over what constitutes interim earnings.3 5
The threat of back pay awards, however, does not leave employers at
the whim of their employees. To continue being eligible for back pay
under Title VII, discrimination victims must use "reasonable diligence" in
obtaining interim earnings. This obligation is an extension of the com-
mon-law duty to mitigate damages.3 6
The Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC elaborated on this miti-
gation duty by requiring an employee who is discriminatorily denied a posi-
tion with a company to seek alternative "suitable employment.137 The
Court stated that, "[A]lthough the unemployed or underemployed claim-
ant need not go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a
demeaning position, he forfeits his right to backpay if he refuses ajob sub-
stantially equivalent to the one he was denied."38 According to the Court, a
newjob is not substantially equivalent if it does not fit the employee's "par-
ticular skills, background, and experience" or if it involves "substantially
more onerous" conditions than the former job.3 9 A new job is also not
33 See, e.g., Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1987); Goldstein v. Man-
hattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1438 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
34 Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 875 F.2d 540, 549 (6th Cir. 1989); Rasimas v. Michi-
gan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 628 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984);
EEOC v. Blue & White Serv. Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1579, 1580 (D. Minn. 1987). See also Bonura v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 629 F. Supp. 353, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (refusing to award lost bonuses as
back pay because such an award would be too speculative). But see Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus.,
Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
35 Interim earnings are those monies obtained by a discrimination victim from other sources
after separation from the discriminatory employer. Courts agree, for example, that any salaries
earned at new jobs should count as interim earnings that reduce any back pay award. See, e.g.,
Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1472 (11th Cir. 1985); Merriweather v. Hercu-
les, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980). Courts disagree, however, on whether unemployment
compensation payments received should reduce the award. Compare Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Mfg.
Co., 715 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (refusing to deduct unemployment compen-
sation payments from back pay awards) with EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542
F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977) (holding that such benefits should
reduce back pay award). The issue really turns on how the "collateral source" rule is interpreted.
This rule specifies that earnings made after the employee is discharged cannot be deducted if
they come from a collateral source to which the employee was entitled independent of the firing.
See, e.g., Knafel v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc., 899 F.2d 1473, 1480 (6th Cir. 1990); Smith v.
Office of Personnel Mgmt., 778 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986).
This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article and has been written about elsewhere
extensively. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 24; Linda L. House, Note, Section 1983 and the
Collateral Source Rue, 40 CLEr; ST. L REv. 101 (1992); Thomas W. Lee, Comment, Deducting Unem-
ployment Compensation and Ending Employment Discrimination: Continuing Conflict, 43 EMORY LJ. 325
(1994).
36 See, e.g., CHARLES T. McCoRMic,, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAcES § 33 (1935):
Where one person has committed a tort, breach of contract, or other legal wrong
against another, it is incumbent upon the latter to use such means as are reasonable
under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages. The person wronged can-
not recover for any item of damage which could thus have been avoided.
Id.
37 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982).
38 Id. at 231-32 (emphasis added) (foomotes omitted).
39 Id. at 231 n.16 (quoting NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
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comparable if the employee would receive reduced benefits or work a
more inconvenient shift.40
The lower federal courts have generally interpreted Ford Motor Co. as
imposing on the employer the burden to plead and prove that the plaintiff
has failed to mitigate damages. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has ruled
that a plaintiffs failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense, and
that a defendant must show both: (1) that suitable positions which the
plaintiff could have discovered were available; and (2) that the plaintiff
"failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking them out."41 The
lower federal courts have ruled inconsistently, however, on what constitutes
reasonable diligence. Some courts have emphasized that the employee
need only make reasonable efforts to get comparable employment. 42
Others have stressed that the employee must look diligently for equivalent
work.43
The federal courts agree, however, that a plaintiffs right to back pay is
tolled on the date the plaintiff could have obtained such employment with
a reasonably diligent search.44 The Supreme Court followed this consensus
in Ford Motor Co., and ruled that the plaintiffs' right to back pay was tolled
as of the date that they turned down an unconditional offer of the job that
40 The federal circuit courts have interpreted the suitable job standard to mean that the new
job must offer virtually the same promotional opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities,
working conditions, and status as the position from which the plaintiff was discharged or for
which the plaintiff was not hired. See, e.g., Sellers v. Delgado Community College, 839 F.2d 1132,
1138 (5th Cir. 1988); Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 624 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984). Ordinarily, employment that requires the employee to
relocate or to work a different shift is not comparable. See, e.g., Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp.,
717 F.2d 114, 118 (4th Cir. 1983); Daniels v. City of Alcoa, 732 F. Supp. 1467, 1477 (E.D. Tenn.
1989).
41 Jackson v. Shell Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d
865, 873 (6th Cir. 1989). One court has ruled, however, that the employer does not have to
demonstrate the availability of comparable employment if the employer can prove that the claim-
ant did not use reasonable efforts to look for employment. Sellers, 839 F.2d at 1132.
42 See, e.g., Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding
that an employee who sought employment only for a month after his discharge by making a few
phone calls mitigated damages by then starting his own business even though he later turned
down job offers comparable to his former job); Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228 (7th
Cir. 1986) (holding that limited search for other employment by woman car salesperson was
understandable because her previous employer had blacklisted her); Hanna v. American Motors
Corp., 724 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984); Or-zel v. Wauwatosa Fire Dep't,
697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.) (holding that one temporaryjob, one employment application, and regis-
tration with state job service was not vigorous effort but did not constitute violation of duty to
mitigate), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
43 See, e.g., Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461 (5th Cir.) (holding that
establishment of part time business and ending job search does not constitute reasonable dili-
gence), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir.
1986) (ruling that an employee failed to mitigate damages when he did no alternative work and
applied for only 16jobs (other than the four jobs he had lost) in the five years after he was fired).
Courts are split on whether self-employment constitutes a failure to mitigate. See, e.g., Smith v.
Great Am. Restaurants, Inc., 969 F.2d 430, 438 (7th Cir. 1992); Carden v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir. 1988); Stuart v. Normandy Osteopathic Ctr., 52 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1552, 1554 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Blumrosen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 47 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1261, 1264 (E.D. Pa. 1987). Courts are also divided on whether going back to
school or switching fields constitutes a failure to mitigate. Fitzpatrick, supra note 24, at 378-79
nn.160-66.
44 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982).
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they had been discriminatorily denied in the first place.45 The federal
courts also generally toll back pay if the employee finds other comparable
employment but is then fired for misconduct,46 or if the employee is un-
available for work, such as due to a disability.47
The law of mitigation is less clear regarding employees who have been
discriminatorily demoted, transferred, harassed, or denied a promotion.
Some federal courts have ruled that such employees must mitigate their
damages by staying and vigorously fighting to get the position to which they
claim entitlement.48 Other courts have said that employees who depart in
such circumstances may still be acting reasonably-the cornerstone of the
duty to mitigate.49
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE DIscHARGE THEORY
The constructive discharge theory was first developed in National La-
bor Relations Board cases involving discrimination against union mem-
bers.50 It was designed to prevent employers from discriminating indirectly
against union members when the employers could not discriminate di-
rectly.5 1 The federal courts appropriated the theory from these NLRB
cases when employers had treated employees poorly, but had not fired
them. 52
The Tenth Circuit's 1975 decision in Muller v. United States Steel Corp.53
was one of the first federal appellate applications of the constructive dis-
charge concept in an employment discrimination case. In Muller, the court
explained that an employee who quit and alleged discrimination could pre-
vail if the employee could show that the employer designed its adverse ac-
tions to get the employee to leave.5 4 Although the court did not clarify
what kind of employer mistreatment was necessary to be actionable, the
Fifth Circuit did so later that year in Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan
Ass'n.55 In Young, the court stated that "if the employer deliberately makes
an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced
into an involuntary resignation, then the employer has encompassed a con-
45 Ford's offer, however, lacked any restoration of seniority to the plaintiffs. The Court felt
that this still did not permit the plaintiff to decline the offer since the plaintiff could accept the
job and continue seeking the restoration of seniority from the trial court. Id. at 232-34.
46 See, e.g., Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, 753 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1985).
47 But see Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1986); Wells v.
North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983).
48 Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel, 803 F.2d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 72-80 and
accompanying text.
49 See, e.g., Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978).
50 NLRB v. Holly Bra, Inc., 405 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1969). See generaly Finnegan, supra
note 10, at 567-68; O'Toole, supra note 9, at 589-96.
51 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894 (1984). The doctrine was designed to make it
illegal for an employer to harass a union employee into resigning by making the working condi-
tions terrible. It was felt that such actions were just as illegal as those of an employer who directly
fired the employee due to his union membership. Finnegan, supra note 10, at 567.
52 O'Toole, supra note 9, at 591; Finnegan, supra note 10, at 567.
53 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
54 Id. at 929.
55 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
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structive discharge and is as liable for any illegal conduct therein as if it
formally discharged the aggrieved employee."56
In Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co.,57 the Fifth Circuit re-
tained Young's intolerable working conditions standard but ruled that an
employee did not have to show that the employer's actions were deliberate.
Instead, the Bourque court stated that a plaintiff must show that the condi-
tions were so intolerable that a "reasonable person in the employee's
shoes" would have felt compelled to resign.58 Virtually all of the other fed-
eral appellate courts have adopted the Bourque standard.5 9 The intent re-
quirement has been retained only by the Fourth60 and Eighth Circuits. 61
Bourque is a seminal decision for this Article because it extended the
constructive discharge analysis to the remedial stage of employment dis-
crimination cases. 62 In Bourque, the district court ruled that the plaintiff
56 Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
57 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980). Courts also have not been unanimous on what constitutes
intolerable conditions. Most courts agree, however, that an illegal reduction in salary or the
illegal denial of a promotion does not amount to a constructive discharge. Aggravating circum-
stances, such as harassment by the employer, are needed as well. Jan A. Buckner, Comment, Help
Wanted: An Expansive Definition of Constructive Discharge Under Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. RPv. 941, 948
n.26 (1988). See also Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1978); Parker
v. Siemens-Allis, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1377, 1389 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
58 Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65.
59 Sanchez v. City of SantaAna, 915 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 815 (1991);
Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412
(7th Cir. 1989); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989); Hopkins v.
Price-Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 490
U.S. 228 (1989); Martin v. Citibank, 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys.
Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982);
Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977). These courts have not inter-
preted the reasonable employee test in precisely the same way, and the Second Circuit in particu-
lar has some contrary authority. See DeAgazio, supra note 11, at n.51.
60 Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082
(1986).
61 Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058
(1986).
62 The decision in Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 U.S. 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 825 (1975), was not exactly on point because the demotion that occurred in that case
was not itself found discriminatory. In Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 n.3 (10th Cir.
1986), the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "Bourque has become the leading case on the subject
of constructive discharge under Title VII."
Courts commonly use constructive discharge principles in making remedial determinations.
As one commentator states:
The constructive discharge issue arises frequently in the relief phase of Title VII employ-
ment discrimination litigation. Typically, a former employee alleges an underlying dis-
criminatory act-such as unlawful demotion, harassment, or failure to promote-and
also claims that her subsequent resignation was involuntary because it resulted from
intolerable working conditions associated with the discrimination. To be eligible for
any relief at all, the plaintiff must of course prove the underlying Title VII violation. To
be eligible for post-resignation relief, however, the plaintiff usually must prove construc-
tive discharge.
DeAgazio, supra note 11, at 986-87; see also id. at 987 n.48 ("The issue more commonly arises in
the relief phase of the lawsuit."); O'Toole, supra note 9, at 587 n.4:
An allegation of constructive discharge can arise in two different contexts. First, an
employee may allege that the constructive discharge was the discriminatory act. If she is
unable to prove this claim, then her employer is not liable. Alternatively, an employer
may be liable for a discriminatory act, e.g. passing a woman over for a promotion on
account of her sex. But if the employee cannot also show that her subsequent resigna-
tion amounted to a constructive discharge, then her employer's liability for back pay
terminates on the date of her resignation. This discussion should not suggest that there
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had been subjected to illegal wage discrimination. 63 The plaintiff argued
that her subsequent resignation from that job was a constructive discharge
and she therefore should get damages for the loss of her job in addition to
those for the wage discrimination. The district court disagreed, ruling that
the plaintiff did not show that the employer intended for her to resign.64
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that she should not have to show that
her employer intended for her to resign in order to prove constructive
discharge. She also argued that her employer's wage discrimination enti-
fled her to recover full back pay because limiting her remedy solely to the
discriminatory wage differential while she held the position would be in-
consistent with Title VII. Finally, she argued that even if her resignation
was not justified under the constructive discharge doctrine, she should
have been paid the wage differential until she obtained permanent
employment. 65
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the plaintiff did not have to prove the
employer's hostile intent 66 The court also ruled, however, that the em-
ployer's unequal wages did not create the kind of objectively intolerable
conditions that justified the plaintiff's departure.67 The court then said
that its refusal to grant a damage award for the plaintiffs back pay after her
resignation was not inconsistent with Title VII because "society and the pol-
icies underlying Title VII will be best served if, wherever, possible, unlawful
discrimination is attacked within the context of existing employment rela-
tionships."6 8 This public policy argument became very popular in later
cases.
69
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs argument that her back
pay for the differential in wages should continue running until she ob-
tained permanent employment. Because constructive discharge was the
only theory that the plaintiff advocated, however, the court never consid-
ered any other theory under which the plaintiffs right to back pay might
continue after she resigned. This Article proposes such a theory.
are two types of constructive discharge; it merely illustrates that different consequences
result depending upon the nature of the constructive discharge allegations.
Id. (emphasis added).
63 Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (accepting
plaintiff argument that she was being discriminated against in that she was being paid lower
wages than men despite doing identical work), afJfd 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
64 Id. at 129.
65 The plaintiff argued that "the proper measure of damages would be the difference be-
tween the rate at which she was compensated and the rate at which male buyers were paid and
that the back pay period should have continued until she obtained permanent employment."
Bourque, 617 F.2d at 66 n.8.
66 Id. at 65.
67 Id. at 66.
68 Id.
69 See infra notes 71-79. That Bourque's public policy argument became so generally accepted
is ironic given that the court in that case may have adopted it only because the plaintiff failed to
offer any contrary rationales. Once again, the problems resulting from poor lawyering on behalf
of a plaintiff in a civil rights case have been felt by the whole civil rights bar.
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III. THE JUDICIAL DiISIONS REGARDING THE DURATION OF BACK PAY
REMEDIES FOR DISCRIMINATION VICTIMS
Most scholars assume that the federal courts uniformly follow the con-
structive discharge rule for determining whether the back pay of a discrimi-
natorily demoted or transferred employee, or an employee who is
discriminatorily denied a promotion, should be tolled when the employee
resigns.70 Although most federal appellate courts are committed to this
approach, several are not. In fact, many federal district courts have gone
their own way. One reason other scholars hold this view may be that courts
have not developed a uniform alternative test. Instead, several alternative
analyses exist.
The First,71 Fifth,72 Sixth, 73 Ninth, 74 Tenth,75 and D.C.76 Circuits77
have followed the constructive discharge analysis. In 1993, the Wisconsin
70 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 24; O'Toole, supra note 9; see also BELTON, supra note 24, at 376;
PAUL N. Cox, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1 17.04, at 17-19 (2d ed. 1992). The major employ-
ment discrimination treatises also include decisions embodying this rule and do not discuss con-
trary cases. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 29, at 700; MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1143 (1994).
71 Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977); see also Marley v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F. Supp. 119 (D.R.I. 1987).
72 Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981).
73 Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel Div. Nat'l Steel, 803 F.2d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Absent
constructive discharge Gomez had a duty to mitigate his damages by remaining on the job.");
Leonard v. City of Frankfort Elec. & Water Plant Bd., 752 F.2d 189, 195 (6th Cir. 1985). Two
Sixth Circuit cases, however, do not seem to embrace fully the constructive discharge approach
and appear to be more sympathetic toward discrimination victims. These cases are: Shore v.
Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985); and Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental
Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984). Ironically, Leonard relies
on Rasimas for support even though the two cases reach very different conclusions. Leonard, 752
F.2d at 195.
74 Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Heagney v. University of Wash.,
642 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 1981), overnued by Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d
1477 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 638 F.
Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 1986). At first glance, the decision in Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802
F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1986), appears to reject the constructive discharge approach and use a mitiga-
tion analysis. However, the Ninth Circuit described the case as involving a refusal to hire. Id. at
1134. While one can quibble with this description, it means that the case does not clearly reject
the constructive discharge approach. Moreover, Thorne suggests that constructive discharge prin-
ciples should apply in promotion denial cases. Id. Several other Ninth Circuit decisions raise
questions about the constructive discharge approach in varied circumstances. Richardson v. Res-
taurant Mkt. Assocs., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 690, 696-97 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Sangster v. United Air Lines,
438 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affid, 633 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971
(1981).
75 Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Lucy v. Manville Sales Corp.,
680 F. Supp. 353 (D. Colo. 1987); cf. Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1133 n.3 (10th Cir.
1983) (describing case as involving actual discharge and rehire followed by resignation; there-
fore, the constructive discharge principles that would apply to demotion cases were inapposite);
Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
The distinctions drawn by the court in Whatey, however, have been criticized as meaningless. See,
e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth Edison, Ch. No. 1984 CN 1997, ALS No. 2718, (l. Hum. Rts.
Comm'n. Sept. 18, 1990) (interim recommended order and decision) ("Neither the Whatey
court nor respondent has offered any authority in support of the purported distinction between
demotion and discharge with rehire, however, nor does any logic appear to support such a
distinction.").
76 Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172-75 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
77 See DeAgazio, supra note 11, at 986-87 ("To be eligible for post-resignation relief [when the
employee resigned in reaction to some other illegal conduct by the employer], however, the
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Supreme Court also adopted this view, despite having voted against it only
a year earlier. 78 Courts using the constructive discharge standard fre-
quently adhere to Bourque's public policy argument that employees should
attack discrimination within their existing employment relationship. 79 The
First Circuit has reasoned that allowing an employee who resigns to receive
back pay would enable the employee to "set himself up as the judge of
every grievance; and the [company or] public taxpayer would end up pay-
ing for periods of idleness while the grievance was being adjudicated."80
Other courts have suggested that permitting an employee to resign and still
get back pay would allow the employee to obtain a windfall by quitting.81
A minority of federal appellate courts are not committed to the con-
structive discharge approach. 82 The Fourth Circuit has relied mainly on
plaintiff usually must prove constructive discharge."); see also Adler v. John Carroll Univ., 549 F.
Supp. 652, 656 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
78 Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 501 N.W.2d 391,
394 (Wis. 1993). But see Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 493 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. 1992).
In K ley, the Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed a Wisconsin statute which guaranteed that
an-employee who took a leave of absence due to a medical or family emergency would receive
equivalent employment upon returning. The court ruled that an employee who was illegally
placed in an inferior position upon returning from leave was entitled to receive lost wages, even
after resigning from the position. The court rejected a constructive discharge requirement and
stated:
Kelley Company also argues that it cannot be liable for reinstatement or back pay be-
cause Marquardt quit and was not constructively discharged. The FMILA does not state
that a constructive discharge is a requirement for reinstatement or back pay. Kelley
Company cites nothing from the legislative history indicating that a constructive dis-
charge is a prerequisite to reinstatement or an award of back pay. We conclude that the
only prerequisite to an order for reinstatement and back pay is that the employer vio-
lated the FML
I& at 78.
More recently, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Marten adopted the constructive
discharge requirement in an employment discrimination case where the employee quit rather
than accept a discriminatory transfer. The court's main reason for adopting the requirement was
the apparent prevalence of this rationale in the federal courts, as well as the public policy favor-
ing the attack on discrimination from within existing employment relationships. Marten, 501
N.W.2d at 395-98. The court's decision was issued over a passionate dissent and reversed an
eloquent appellate court ruling that rejected the constructive discharge standard.
79 In a pre-Bourque case involving a government employee who resigned after a demotion in
violation of the First Amendment, the First Circuit stated that "the employee has no right simply
to walk out; he must accept the orders of his superior, even if felt to be unjust, until relieved of
them byjudicia or administrative action." Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119
(lst Cir. 1977). Both Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340,343-44 (10th Cir. 1986), andJurgens v.
EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 389-91 (5th Cir. 1990), for example, discuss Bourque at length.
80 Alicea Rosado, 562 F.2d at 119.
81 Id.; see supra note 16. In Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980),
the Fifth Circuit stated that "[u]nequal pay is not a sufficientjustification to relieve Ms. Bourque
of her duty to mitigate damages by remaining on the job." See also Gomez v. Great lakes Steel
Div. Nat'l Steel, 803 F.2d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 1986); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981).
82 Two employment discrimination treatises question the public policy rationale that lies be-
hind Bourque without, however, offering any contrary case authority. See, e.g., MICHAEL ZIMMER ET
AL, CASES AND MATERIAS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATnON 136 (1994) (Teacher's Manual) (dis-
cussingJurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990)):
In reaching this conclusion, the court gave great weight to encouraging employees to
attack discrimination in the context of an existing employment relationship. What ulti-
mate purpose is this policy intended to serve? Economic efficiency? Shouldn't the
court be more concerned with allowing employees to avoid the effects of ongoing dis-
crimination?. . . Even if Gordon was not constructively discharged, why didn't the court
simply reduce his back pay award by the amount of earnings he voluntarily relinquished
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mitigation of damage principles to determine whether back pay should be
tolled after the discrimination victim resigns.83 Moreover, the Second and
Eighth Circuit have appeared on both sides of the issue. In Carrero v. New
York City Housing Authority,8 4 the Second Circuit relied on mitigation princi-
ples and held that an employee who took a voluntary leave of absence after
being discriminatorily demoted was entitled to back pay. A year earlier,
however, in a different case, the Second Circuit had accepted plaintiff's
resignation date as the point at which the liability period ended.8 5 Con-
versely, although recently following the constructive discharge approach,86
the Eighth Circuit in Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce stated that the plain-
tiff's back pay should not be cut off as long as the resignation was part of a
good faith effort to obtain a comparable job elsewhere and was based on
"mitigative motives." T8 In applying mitigation principles, these courts as-
sess the reasonableness of the employee's resignation given her
circumstances.88
The strongest reasoning in favor of this minority approach is that it
allows victims to escape discrimination without forfeiting substantial reme-
dies. As poignantly noted by a Wisconsin appellate court, requiring a dis-
crimination victim to stay put to mitigate damages was like requiring
"victims of legal malpractice to continue being serviced by their negligent
by retirement? Although other courts agree that the back pay period ends upon volun-
tary resignation, this approach arguably prevents a discriminatee from recovering some
amounts he actually lost due to discrimination. Perhaps Ford requires this approach.
However, 'requiring' an un- or underemployed person to accept an offer of employ-
ment may have more economic efficiency than 'requiring' an employee not to retire.
Id.; see also FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 29, at 705 ("But does this rationale make sense
where the victim of discrimination has no opportunity, within the employment relationship, to
overcome discrimination? Is any interest served by making plaintiff stay on the job while she sues
her employer?").
83 Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir.), cert. denied; 454 U.S. 860
(1981); cf. Wells v. North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
84 890 F.2d 569, 580 (2d Cir. 1989).
85 Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 852 F.2d 688, 690 (2d Cir. 1988).
86 Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks & Sewer Dep't, 802 F.2d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 1986);
see also Parker v. Siemens-Allis, Inc., 601 F.Supp. 1377, 1389 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
87 Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that em-
ployer's payment of unequal wages may make employer liable for back pay due to employee's
resignation if plaintiffs resignation was based on mitigative motives). Several district courts
agree. See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(reasoning that restriction on postresignation relief "would discourage a plaintiff from mitigating
damages by accepting a position at another employer where he or she would be permitted to
advance without discrimination" (citing Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794 (D. D.C. 1986))), rev'd
on other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993); Daines v. City of
Mankato, 754 F. Supp. 681, 702 (D. Minn. 1990); Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 392 F. Supp. 254, 255-
56 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (holding that employee who was discriminatorily denied a promotion did
not have to remain in assembly line job and that court could determine back pay entitlement
using mitigation principles). The fact that the Eighth Circuit has decisions on both sides of this
issue demonstrates the confusion that exists. See also cases cited supra note 74.
88 See, e.g., Carrero, 890 F.2d at 580; Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984); Di Salvo, 568 F.2d at 598. What is surprising, how-
ever, is that these courts do not generally address or even acknowledge the federal appellate
court decisions employing constructive discharge standards, and the courts employing construc-
tive discharge standards do not usually address the possibility of using general mitigation
standards.
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lawyer in order to give the lawyer the chance to improve his or her skills."8 9
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appel-
late court, one dissenting justice pursued this theme when he rhetorically
asked, "Do victims of domestic assault have to stay in an abusive marriage in
order to give the abusive spouse a chance to change his or her behavior or
risk damages to which they may be entitled?" 90 The mitigation oriented
courts have also reasoned that requiring discrimination victims to stay put,
to remain eligible for back pay, forces them to turn down jobs elsewhere
with substantial advancement opportunities.91 In the words of the Second
Circuit, such a requirement places the employee "in the same spot as the
sailor caught between the devil and the deep."92
Other courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have used tort law princi-
ples to resolve the issue. They have generally refused to toll the discrimina-
tion victim's right to back pay after the victim resigns, reasoning that the
employer's earlier illegal act proximately caused the employee's resigna-
tion.93 Finally, some courts and scholars compromise by suggesting that
constructive discharge standards should apply but that the standard for de-
89 Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Department of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations, 491 N.W.2d 96,
99 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). The decision, however, has been reversed. 501 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Wis.
1993). For further discussion of this case, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
90 Marten Transp., 501 N.W.2d at 400 (Bablitch,J., dissenting).
91 SeeEzolA 758 F. Supp. at 310 ("The elimination of the availability of relief past the date of a
Title VII plaintiff's resignation... would discourage a plaintiff from mitigating damages by ac-
cepting a position at another employer where he or she would be permitted to advance without
discrimination."), rev'd on other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88
(1998); Harrison, 643 F. Supp. at 796-97:
Failure to grant Ms. Howard back pay for the period after she left MarAd conflicts with
both parts of this duty-it neither compensates Ms. Howard for her injury, nor deters
MarAd from its discrimination. Furthermore, it would discourage a claimant from miti-
gating damages by accepting a position at another agency. Terminating back pay relief
upon resignation, for instance, would penalize Ms. Howard for moving to ACTION
where she was allowed to advance without discrimination.
Id.
92 Carrero, 890 F.2d at 580. Carrero was unique in that the employee was placed on an unpaid
leave of absence which she had to continue to remain eligible for ajob with the Housing Author-
ity that discriminated against her. One of the leave's conditions was that she could not obtain
income elsewhere. She therefore could not look for paid employment without abandoning her
chances at the Housing Authority. Thus, she was "caught" since she had no income source and
yet could not work elsewhere.
93 Wells v. North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1044 (1984); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 454 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see
also Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., 489 F. Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding
that plaintiff is entitled to post-resignation backpay because she quit due to disagreements with
the man hired for the position which she was discriminatorily denied). This decision is similar to
Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975), which involved a company that
illegally segregated job classifications by race.
In Hairston, the company sought to remedy its conduct by offering transfers and promotions
to the injured minority employees to predominantly white jobs. Because the employees would
have to give up the seniority they had obtained in their earlier jobs, they therefore rejected the
offers. The company then argued that these employees' back pay should be cut off. The Fourth
Circuit, however, ruled for the employees and said that their back pay could be cut off only if
their refusal of these offers was a "free and voluntary act," as opposed to an effort to avoid the
company's discriminatory policy. Id. at 232. As one commentator summarizes the case, "The
court reasoned that the employees were justifiably reluctant to expose themselves to further ill
effects of a discriminatory employment policy." Laurie A. Lewis, Note, Diluting Relief Under Title
Vk Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 32 .CA . U. L. REv. 665, 675
(1983).
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termining what constitutes a constructive termination should be lessened,
especially in promotion cases. 94 One court ruled, for example, that an em-
ployee was free to leave, after she was discriminatorily denied a promotion.
She did not lose her back pay, since there was no hope that the employer
would change its mind.95
The federal courts are not of one mind over whether discrimination
victims who resign may continue to recover back pay. The federal appel-
late courts have generally adopted the constructive discharge approach,
but a healthy minority of federal courts disagree. Failure to recognize
these differing approaches obscures recognition of how the constructive
discharge approach defeats Title VII's purposes.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH EXTENDING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE PRINCIPLES TO
BACK PAY DETERMINATIONS
Title VII's text is vague regarding many important issues.96 Courts and
scholars, however, have adopted several statutory construction techniques
to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutes. These techniques shed
light on whether Title VII supports extending constructive discharge prin-
ciples to back pay determinations. They also make possible an in-depth
analysis that is missing from most of the cases.97 This detailed statutory
analysis reveals the problems in using the constructive discharge approach
as a means of fulfilling Title VII's remedial goals.
A. The Process-Oriented Approach to Statutory Interpretation
Courts that use a process-oriented method of statutory interpretation
seek to determine the unitary purposes embodied in statutes. When a stat-
ute is subject to multiple interpretations in a particular case, the court
94 Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reo'd on other grounds and
remanded, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr, & Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 310
(E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88
(1993); Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 570, 572-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); DeAgazio,
supra note 11. This line of decisions makes resignation easier for employees who are discrimi-
nated against in promotions than it is for employees who are demoted. This is odd because most
courts have ruled that employees who lose jobs that they have held suffer more severe injuries
than those who do not obtain jobs that they wanted. The employees who are demoted suffer a
greater injury because they have an expectation interest in their job that can even border on a
property right. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986). Thus, these
courts may have it backwards. It should be easier for the demoted employee to resign and con-
tinue to recover back pay because the demoted employee has suffered a greater discriminatory
injury. This is another example of how confused the courts and scholars are on these issues.
95 Nobler, 715 F. Supp. at 572-74. This is similar to the futility exception to exhaustion of
remedies doctrines. SeeScelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Holt
v. Continental Group, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D. Conn.), affid, 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).
96 Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Polities of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L.
REv. 37, 58-59 (1991) (discussing ambiguities in Title VII's text and in other civil rights laws);
Burt Neuborne, Background Norms for Federal Statutory Interpretation, 22 CONN. L. Rxv. 721, 726
(1990) ("Title VII, as a political compromise in 1964, was consciously vague on many delicate
issues.").
97 The Ninth Circuit in Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984), for
instance, did not analyze the issue but simply followed another court.
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selects the interpretation that best fulfills these purposes.98 The U.S.
Supreme Court used this process approach in Ford Motor Co., analyzing the
"transcendental" purposes embodied in Title VII's remedial provisions to
resolve a mitigation issue.99 This analysis is the key to determining whether
the courts that use the constructive discharge approach are correct given
that Ford Motor Co. is the Court's seminal decision on how to apply mitiga-
tion principles to employment discrimination back pay awards.
In Ford Motor Co., the Court required two women, who had been dis-
criminatorily denied jobs at Ford, to accept Ford's unconditional offers of
reinstatement or their right to recover back pay would be tolled.100 The
Court acknowledged that the Ford offer did not provide the injured wo-
men with their lost seniority and their lost back pay.101 The Court ruled,
however, that the women were still free to seek those remedies in their
pending case.' 0 2 The Court added that the women would not have been
required to accept a demotion. 03
Justice O'Connor's opinion found Title VII to have twin aims.104 "The
'primary objective' of Title VII," according to Justice O'Connor, "is to bring
employment discrimination to an end,"105 or to deter discrimination.
When deterrence fails, "Title VII's secondary, fallback purpose is to com-
pensate the victims for their injuries. To this end, § 706(g) aims "'to make
the victims of unlawful discrimination whole'" by restoring them, "'so far as
possible... to a position where they would have been were it not for the
unlawful discrimination.'" 10 6 The key question is whether these purposes
are well served by the constructive discharge rule.
98 Professor Reynolds describes this approach:
[T]he Hart and Sacks acolyte does not ask what the individual legislators "thought" or
"intended" about the specific problem up for resolution. Rather, the acolyte asks what
good did they seek to achieve (or what evil did they attempt to eliminate). The inter-
preter then construes the statutes to further that goal, at least if that can be done with-
out doing violence to statutory language.
William L. Reynolds, A Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation Today, 94 W. VA. L. REv. 927, 930
(1992). This approach has been severely criticized as involving a great amount of subjectivity. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. RE%. 405, 427-28 (1989)
("The characterization of legislative purpose is an act of creation rather than discovery.... Inter-
pretation that brings the legislature into the present will ... inevitably involve a large measure of
discretion and a corresponding danger ofjudicial abuse."). The more popular approach is the
textual analysis. Nonetheless, in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982), the Court clearly
used the process-oriented approach.
Courts use this methodology in addressing other Title VII issues as well. In Wallace v. Dunn
Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated and rehkgen banc granted, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th
Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit rejected a draconian interpretation of the after-acquired evi-
dence defense in employment discrimination cases because such a defense was inconsistent with
Title VIi's basic purposes.
99 See MinnaJ. Kotkin, Public RemediesforPrivate Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VUi Back Pay Rem-
edy, 41 HASTNGS LJ. 1301, 1374 (1990).
100 Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 241.
101 Id. at 222.
102 Id at 227 n.9.
103 Id at 231.
104 Id. at 230.
105 Id. at 228. She also noted that "[d]elays in litigation unfortunately are now commonplace,
forcing the victims of discrimination to suffer years of underemployment or unemployment
before they can obtain a court order awarding them the jobs unlawfully denied them." Id.
106 Id. at 230 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (quoting 118
CONG. Rc. 7168 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams))).
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1. The Deterrence Purpose
Employers are less likely to discriminate when the aggregate cost of
discriminating increases. High costs are therefore a powerful deterrent to
discrimination. The constructive discharge rule, however, contravenes Ti-
tle VII's deterrent purpose by cutting off the damages that discrimination
victims who resign otherwise could continue recovering. The rule reduces
the overall cost of discrimination for the employers and thus reduces Tite
VII's deterrent effect.
The constructive discharge rule also has a more subtle and insidious
effect on how discriminatory employers treat particular injured employees
who refuse to resign. It decreases employer incentives to rectify and to
avoid discriminating because the employer knows that the employee may
wear down and resign because of the continuing discrimination.10 7 It may
even lead employers to engage in worse discrimination against such employ-
ees in the hopes of obtaining their resignation and cutting off their right to
recovery. 10 8 The employer then no longer needs to deal with a disgruntled
employee who has sued the company. These kinds of employer actions
would be the antithesis of Title VII's deterrent purposes, and yet they are
facilitated by the constructive discharge rule.
One response is that employers do not have incentives to continue
discriminating because their damages will increase as long as they discrimi-
nate. This argument has merit, however, only as to employers who do not
expect their discrimination to result in a resignation. Under any other cir-
cumstances, employers can reasonably expect these increased short term
damages will be outweighed by the long term savings brought about by
both the employee's resignation and the resulting termination of the em-
ployee's right to recover long term damages. 10 9
107 As the district court in Ezold stated:
Application of the constructive discharge rule here would give employers a free hand to
engage in a careful campaign of subtle discrimination against an employee-such as
inferior work assignments, etc.-which so long as it does not rise to the level of making
working conditions intolerable, would not make the employer responsible for its unlaw-
ful actions past the date at which the victimized employee surrenders by resigning.
... Title VII is no less empowered to eradicate those discriminatory acts which are
subtly disguised and carefully implemented as it is with respect to those acts of blatant
discrimination which make working conditions intolerable ....
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993); see also DeAgazio, supra note
11, at 997-98. Moreover, in Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated
and reh'g en banc granted, 32 F.3d 1489 (1lth Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit refused to permit
employers to use after-acquired evidence as a liability defense because such a rule "invites em-
ployers to establish ludicrously low thresholds for 'legitimate' termination" and thus permits em-
ployers to "sandbag" an employee. Id. at 1180.
108 See supra note 11. The district court in Ezold stated that "no matter how severe an em-
ployer's discrimination is... an employee would be forced to remain in the inferior employment
position so long as the employer does not permit the working conditions of the inferior position
to become intolerable." Ezold, 758 F. Supp. at 308. Although the Ezold case dealt with the denial
of a promotion, the court said that its reasoning would also cover "the demoralizing stagnation of
a discriminatory demotion, to the more subtle discrimination contained in subjection to different
working conditions." Id. at 310.
109 It could be argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 takes care of this deterrence problem
because it permits courts to award punitive damages against defendants in order to deter particu-
larly egregious discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1) (Supp. V 1993). Thus, any employer
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The rigid constructive discharge doctrine therefore permits employers
to accomplish the effect of a discriminatory discharge without risking the
same ongoing liability. The employer who illegally fires an employee con-
tinues paying damages until the employee can find substantially equivalent
employment. Such severe long term penalties are a substantial deterrent
to discrimination. In contrast, the company that succeeds in having an em-
ployee resign from a discriminatory demotion also ousts the employee, but
only pays damages for a limited period.
Perhaps most perverse, the constructive discharge standard not only
lessens the incentives of employers not to discriminate, it actually forces
employees to experience more discrimination. By requiring discrimination
victims to stay in their discriminatory placement to remain eligible for back
pay,110 this standard contravenes Title VII's purpose of deterring such inju-
ries."' As a dissenting justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently
stated, "The constructive discharge doctrine ignores the reality of discrimi-
nation. Discrimination is a degrading, humiliating, debilitating experience
for its victims. Requiring a victim to stay in that setting or lose what they
are entitled to is... outrageous .... ,,112 Thejustice compared the effect of
the doctrine to requiring incest victims to stay with their parents so that the
parents would get a second chance to get over their problems."13
2. The "Make Whole" Purpose
The Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. stated that discrimination victims
did not have to accept demotions to mitigate damages because those jobs
do not make the employee whole. 1 4 Relying on Ford Motor Co., the Second
Circuit in Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority"15 ruled that an illegally
demoted employee had no obligation to accept a demotion. The court
held that the plaintiff "was not required to accept a demotion to mitigate
damages and that the Heating Plant Technician position was a demotion"
from her probationary Assistant Superintendent job."16
According to the constructive discharge rule, however, employees
must accept inferior jobs with their current employer unless the job cir-
who avoids paying the discrimination victim's back pay could still owe a large punitive judgment
with a powerful deterrent effect. There are several problems with this argument.
First, the Act's punitive damage provisions contain a cap and thus courts may not be able to
assess an amount sufficiently large to deter. See id. at § 1981a(b) (3) (A)-(D) (Supp. V 1993). Sec-
ond, punitive damages were never intended to serve as a substitute for inadequate backpay reme-
dies. Those remedies are supposed to make up for all of the back pay that was lost and thus have
a specific deterrent effect in that area. Finally, interpreting the Civil Rights Act in a manner that
leads to a reduction in a discrimination victim's right to relief would constitute Orwellian
doublespeak given that statute's goal of providing more effective remedies. See supra note 25;
infra note 134.
110 See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
111 See supra note 105.
112 Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 501 N.W.2d 391,
401 (Wis. 1993).
113 Id. at 400.
114 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982).
115 890 F.2d 569, 580 (2d Cir. 1989).
116 Id.
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cumstances are intolerable.117 In Jurgens v. EEOC 18 the Fifth Circuit de-
clared that Ford Motor Co.'s statement that employees need not accept
demotions refers to employees who are not with the company that discrimi-
nated against them. According to the Fifth Circuit, employees whose com-
panies have demoted them must remain in the inferior position to mitigate
damages. 119 This view receives some support from the facts in Ford Motor
Co. since the plaintiffs in that case were not employed by Ford when they
incurred the discrimination.
Jurgens' narrow reading, however, lacks support in the Court's lan-
guage, as Carrero demonstrates, °20 and is inconsistent with the compensa-
tory goal of Title VII. Ford Motor Co. broadly states that the duty to mitigate
does not encompass demotions, and the opinion does not limit that state-
ment solely to situations in which the position was at another company.
More importantly, Jurgens' interpretation would not make discrimination
victims whole. The rule penalizes victims of discrimination by forcing them
to either stay and accept additional discrimination or resign and risk cut-
ting off their right to back pay and reinstatement. Under Jurgens, employ-
ees who resign to escape continuing discrimination are left jobless and
likely will not be able to recover full back pay, even though theirjoblessness
is causally related to their employer's discriminatory action.' 21 Such a re-
sult is antithetic to the "make whole" purpose of Title VII.122
117 See supra notes 56-61.
118 903 F.2d 386, 389 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990).
119 1& at 389.
120 Carrero expressly interprets the language in Ford Motor Co. to preclude a discrimination
victim from having to remain in an inferiorjob with the discriminating employer. Carrero v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1989). It is noteworthy that the Fifth Circuit
in Jurgens was uncomfortable with the constructive discharge test as it characterized that test as
part of the employee's duty to mitigate. Jurgens, 903 F.2d at 389.
121 See, e.g., Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 454 F. Supp. 78, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding
that employee's resignation did not toll back pay where it was "proximately caused" by discrimina-
tory demotion).
122 Professor Kotkin has pointed out that "the employee denied a promotion who files suit,
but remains in her position, probably has jeopardized her advancement and lost opportunity far
beyond that compensable by the pay differential between the two positions." Kotkin, supra note
99, at 1371. She added:
Even without statutory modification, the Title VII remedial scheme could be applied
more flexibly by the courts to permit compensation for economic harm that does not
take the form of lost pay. Such relief could be viewed as equitable restitution for the loss
of employment opportunity. It would be particularly appropriate in the following cir-
cumstances, assuming a finding of discrimination: the employee who is rejected for a
position, but accepts another job with an equivalent salary and does not wish to return
to the original position; the employee who is denied a promotion for which the pay
differential is not great; the employee who is harassed but suffers no monetary conse-
quences; and the employee who is terminated, shortly thereafter obtains comparable
work, and does not wish reinstatement .... Finally, the terminated employee may be
suffering or may suffer in the future economic consequences as a result of ajob change
stemming from a discharge.
Id. Professor Kotkin, however, wrote this article prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
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3. A Process-Oriented Argument Favoring the Constructive Discharge
View
The constructive discharge courts disagree with much of the above
reasoning, proclaiming that Title VII seeks to promote, above all, the inter-
nal resolution of discrimination complaints. These courts are unquestiona-
bly correct in stating that the antidiscrimination statutes were designed to
facilitate voluntary compliance. The EEOC administrative conciliation
mechanism created by Title VII shows this,123 and the Supreme Court has
recognized this intent as well.
In Ford Motor Co., Justice O'Connor stated that the preferred method
of ending discrimination complaints and making deserving plaintiffs whole
was through voluntary compliance and cooperation.' 2 4 A recent Supreme
Court decision required a plaintiff who signed an arbitration agreement to
submit his employment discrimination claims for private arbitration, rather
than go to court. 125 Moreover, Ford Motor Co. suggests that Title VII's
"make whole" language need not be taken literally since the Court in that
case actually ruled that the plaintiff's right to back pay could be cut off
even though she had not been offered full relief (e.g., back pay and
seniority) .126
These constructive discharge courts misinterpret Title VII and Ford
Motor Co., however, by mistakenly elevating Title VII's procedural prefer-
ences over its fundamental substantive purposes of deterring discrimina-
tion and making discrimination victims whole.' 2 7 Justice O'Connor's
reference to the private resolution of disputes and lower court references
to the EEOC conciliation mechanism show only that such methods of reso-
lution are preferred when acceptable to all parties since they are cheaper
and faster than going to court. 128 Nothing in these authorities suggests
that private resolution of disputes is to be encouraged when it would pro-
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
124 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228-30 (1982).
125 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). But see Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that a discrimination complaint that was connected
to a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause did not have to be arbitrated because
Title VII is not limited by the agreement's arbitration procedures).
126 Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231-34.
127 Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("The
elimination of the availability of relief past the date of a Title VII plaintiff's resignation would
conflict with the remedial duty specified above in that the plaintiff could neither be compensated
for his or her injury, nor would a defendant be deterred from further discrimination."), rev'd on
other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1998); Harrison v. Dole, 643
F. Supp. 794, 796-97 (D.D.C. 1986) ("Failure to grant Ms. Howard back pay for the period after
she left MarAd conflicts with both parts of this duty-it neither compensates Ms. Howard for her
injury, nor deters MarAd from its discrimination."). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed these
twin aims on numerous occasions in Title VII cases. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995) ("Deterrence is one object of these statutes. Compensa-
tion ... is another."). Others have confirmed the importance of not losing sight of Title VR's
primary goals. E.g.,James G. Babb, Comment, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence as a Defense in Title
VI Employment Discrimination Cases, 30 Hous. L. Rnv. 1945, 1973-75 (1994).
128 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228-30 (1982) (stating that in a better world dis-
crimination cases would proceed more quickly because of their importance).
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mote discrimination and frustrate a plaintiff's desire to be made whole. 29
Indeed, after a certain time period, an employment discrimination plaintiff
can automatically obtain a "right to sue" letter and bypass the administra-
tive conciliation machinery of Title VII with a federal court lawsuit.'3 0
Moreover, Title VII, like most civil rights statutes, has no exhaustion of
remedies requirement.' 3 '
This voluntary cooperation argument also mistakenly assumes that an
employee and employer cannot privately resolve a discrimination com-
plaint after the employee has left the position. The company still can make
the employee an offer to settle, and the employee still can accept. The only
difference is that the employee probably has more freedom to turn down
the offer and continue negotiating since the discriminating employer is no
longer the boss and therefore lacks the ability to pressure the employee at
the workplace in a variety of subtle and not-so-subtle ways (e.g., changing
workshifts, office locations, etc.). This increased freedom is consistent with
Title VII which should not be interpreted to give a company that discrimi-
nates the power to restrict the victim's flexibility. 132
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also shows that a cooperative process
should not take precedence over strong remedies. The Act seeks to pro-
vide more comprehensive remedies to employment discrimination vic-
tims. 133 It permits Title VII plaintiffs to seek punitive damages and
compensatory damages, such as for emotional distress. As noted by the
Third Circuit, a parsimonious interpretation of the Title VII remedies pro-
visions is no longer justifiable in light of the Act.'34 The constructive dis-
charge standard exemplifies such a narrow interpretation.
129 See Sunstein, supra note 98, at 497-98 (arguing that in trying to prioritize and harmonize
various statutory purposes, those purposes which "favor [the] broad interpretation of statutes
protecting disadvantaged groups" should often be favored).
130 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
131 Cf Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (noting that the leading federal civil
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has no requirement that non-judicial remedies be exhausted).
Title VII requires the plaintiff to initiate an administrative action but does not require the plain-
tiff to wait until the final completion of all stages of that action. See supra note 26.
132 Requiring the victim to remain with the discriminating employer for internal resolution
restricts the victim's flexibility. Specifically, it becomes financially difficult for the victim to ac-
cept jobs at other companies because acceptance means abandoning the discriminating em-
ployer and losing the right to back pay. See, e.g., Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794, 796-97
(D.D.C. 1986):
Failure to grant Ms. Howard back pay for the period after she left MarAd ... would
discourage a claimant from mitigating damages by accepting a position at another
agency. Terminating back pay relief upon resignation, for instance, would penalize Ms.
Howard for moving to ACTION where she was allowed to advance without
discrimination.
Id. See supra notes 91-92; see also supra note 82 (quoting employment treatises critiquing this
rule).
133 See, e.g.,Jody R. King, Comment, A Case Frozen in Time: Does Title VWl's 1991 Amendment Strip
United States v. Burke of Its Precedential Value, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 109, 124 (1993); Michael A.
Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smoke, There is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives
Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959, 983 (1994).
134 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1235 n.23 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995); see also DeAgazio, supra note 11, at 991 n.66:
It is unclear what effect the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will have on the constructive dis-
charge rule's prohibition of postresignation relief. The 1991 Act permits Title VII plain-
tiffs to sue for compensatory and punitive damages in disparate treatment cases ... in
addition to those remedies already available .... However, it does seem logical to infer
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B. The Canons of Statutory Construction
The canons of statutory construction are rules that courts use to inter-
pret ambiguous statutes.' 3 5 A common example is the rule that courts
should construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems.'3 6 Karl Llewel-
lyn almost singlehandedly destroyed the canons by showing that in any situ-
ation, courts could determine the result arbitrarily by choosing between
two equally applicable yet conflicting canons.' 3 7 Despite his critique,
courts have continued to use the canons, and an increasing number of
scholars are finding the canons to be instructive. 38 Two canons are rele-
vant here.
First, many courts have said that statutes are to be liberally construed if
remedial in nature.'3 9 This liberal construction ensures that remedial stat-
utes are effective.' 40 This approach clearly seems warranted with respect to
Title VII. Not only is the statute remedial in nature, section 309 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 expressly specifies that Title VII should be liberally con-
strued.' 4 ' The constructive discharge rule, however, is contrary to this stat-
that, where the plaintiff has been constructively discharged, any damage award will be
more than would be the case where the plaintiff was not constructively discharged.
Therefore, constructive discharge will likely remain a hotly disputed issue in employ-
ment discrimination litigation.
Id.; Mark S. Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling A Legal Theory for Attacking Discrimination Against
Woman Partners, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 17, 39-40 n.87 (1994); supra note 25 (quoting Mardel4 31 F.3d at
1235 n.23); infra notes 157-61 & accompanying text.
135 BLAcK's LAW Dicrio ,AY 207 (6th ed. 1990) defines the canons as, "[T]he system of funda-
mental rules and maxims which are recognized as governing the construction or interpretation of
written instruments." They have a long historical pedigree. See, e.g., S. S. PELOUBET, A CoLLEc-
TION OF LEGAL MAXIMS IN LAw AND EQuriY (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1985) (1884); HERBERT
BROOM, BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMS (7th ed. 1874).
136 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 147-50.
137 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). For example, Llewellyn said
that for the maxim that courts should adhere to the plain meaning of the text, there is a counter-
maxim that courts should vindicate the spirit of the law. Id. at 401. A more recent critique can
be found in Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHi. L. REV. 800, 805-17 (1983).
138 SuNS-rIN, supra note 1, at 149. According to Professor Sunstein:
[T]he canons of construction continue to be a prominent feature in the federal and
state courts. The use of guides to interpretation-in the form of principles requiring a
clear statement from Congress to reach certain results and background understand-
ings--can be found in every area of modem law. And there is no sign that canons are
decreasing in importance.
Id. For a case that shows the process-purposive school of legislative interpretation, see Rowland v.
California Men's Colony, 113 S. Ct. 716, 726 n.12 (1993). A good "plain meaning" case is Fried-
rich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated and remanded; 499 U.S. 933
(1991). A case that uses legislative intent is Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Group, 426 U.S. 1
(1976). A case that appears to use an approach similar to the new canons is Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (presumption favoring state sovereignty is crucial to holding).
139 Llewellyn, supra note 137, at 401-06.
140 See supra note 122 (discussing Professor Kotkin's article and the fact that the antidis-
crimination statutes have not fully compensated discrimination victims for their injuries). This
interpretation is also consistent with the canon, "Where the law gives a right, it gives a remedy to
recover." EDwAIW J. BANDER, DICTIONARY OF SELECr LEGAL TERMS AND MAXIMS 123 (2d ed.
1979).
141 Section 309 has two other relevant provisions. First, it states that where the Civil Rights Act
can be given alternative interpretations, courts should use the one which most effectively ad-
vances Congress' underlying purposes. Second, it states that the Act's amendments to Title VII
and to other civil rights statutes should not be interpreted to mean that Congress approves of all
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utory canon because the rule makes Title VII's remedial provisions less
effective. 142
A second canon counsels that courts should restrictively interpret stat-
utes in derogation of the common law.143 This canon appears on the sur-
face to favor the restrictive constructive discharge approach because Title
VII can be viewed as in derogation of the common law. The Supreme
Court, however, has taken a different view of the mitigation language. Ac-
cording to Ford Motor Co., Title VII's mitigation principles are derived from
the common law.' 44 By definition, therefore, these principles need not be
restrictively interpreted.
C. The Legislative Intent Approach
To determine a statute's meaning, courts and scholars often rely on
"legislative history," including congressional floor debates, committee re-
ports, conference reports, and other materials. 145 Justice Scalia, among
others, has argued that such materials are unreliable, however, because
they are generated by powerful special interest groups and because courts
often rely on stray remarks in the legislative record to bolster whatever re-
sult they want. 146 Nonetheless, many courts rely on these materials to de-
cide what statutes mean.147 Applied to Title VII, the legislative intent
approach draws into question the validity of the constructive discharge test.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, nor its
1972 and 1991 amendments, explains precisely when an illegally demoted
employee's right to back pay terminates.' 48 However, Title VII's require-
ment that discrimination victims act with "reasonable diligence" to obtain
federal court decisions regarding issues that were not the subject of an amendment. Thus, con-
structive discharge proponents cannot argue that Congress' failure to nullify that approach to
remedies means that Congress has accepted the approach. See Civil Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071, 1093-94 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1209 (Supp. IV 1991)).
But seeAnkenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (holding that Congress intended for federal
court jurisdiction not to cover domestic relations matters because Congress revised federal judi-
cial statute and did not repudiate earlier decisions finding a domestic relations jurisdictional
exception).
142 This view is also consistent with the canon which specifies that ambiguous statutes should
be interpreted in light of the spirit behind the statute and by the use of equitable principles.
BANDER, supra note 140, at 118. A rigid interpretation would not follow this rule.
143 BANDER, supra note 140, at 134 ("Things which are derogate from the common law are to
be strictly interpreted."); SUNSrMN, supra note 1, at 5-6; Jefferson B. Fordham &J. Russell Leach,
Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REv. 438 (1950).
144 The Court referred to mitigation doctrine as having an "ancient" heritage. Ford Motor
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982).
145 E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989); see also Greenberger, supra
note 96, at 67-68 (discussing the value of good legislative history materials in construing statutes).
146 Reynolds, supra note 98, at 940; Greenberger, supra note 96, at 66-67.
147 See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 205 (1991) ("The legislative history
confirms what the language of the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] compels. Both the House and
Senate Reports accompanying the legislation indicate that this statutory standard was chosen to
protect female workers from being treated differently from other employees simply because of
their capacity to bear children.").
148 Given this omission, the rest of this section looks at the legislative history of the mitigation
provisions of Title VII. This analysis does not beg the question because courts. that have adopted
the constructive discharge approach acknowledge that it is simply an interpretation of the mitiga-
tion duties which Title VII places on discrimination victims. See, e.g., Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d
386, 389 (5th Cir. 1990).
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interim earnings appears to be based on cases brought under the National
Labor Relations Act, which in turn drew on common-law mitigation of
damages principles. 49
One of the most important NLRA cases, which applied mitigation of
damage principles to illegal employment discharges, was the Supreme
Court's decision in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB.15 0 In Phelps, the Court ruled
that an employee who had been discriminatorily discharged for being a
union member should only lose his right to back pay if the employer dem-
onstrates that the employee had engaged in "a clearly unjustifiable refusal
to take desirable new employment."' 51 Phelps' lenient view of when back
pay is available should apply to Title VII because Ford Motor Co. suggests
that Phelps is one source of Title VII's duty to mitigate. 152
The common-law mitigation principles upon which the NLRA drew
clarify the employee's duty. The seminal treatise on remedies under the
common law is by Professor Dan Dobbs. 53 He writes that the defendant
must show both that the plaintiff did not make reasonable efforts at mini-
mizing damages and that if plaintiff had made such efforts, the plaintiff
would have succeeded at reducing the damages.' 54 As to what constitutes
reasonable efforts, Professor Dobbs explains:
The plaintiff is not required to accept great risks, undertake heroic meas-
ures, or accept great personal sacrifice to minimize damages for the bene-
fit of the defendant. . . . [S]imilarly . . . if the plaintiff is wrongly
discharged from employment,.. . she is not required to accept substan-
149 Scholars believe that Title VII's remedial provisions were based to some extent on the
National Labor Relation Act. Kotkin, supra note 99, at 1315-27. The Supreme Court has been
more definite, stating that Title VII's "backpay provision was expressly modeled on the backpay
provision of the National Labor Relations Act." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419
n.1l (1975). Albemarle cites to relevant portions of Title VII's legislative history. Id. The Court in
Ford Motor Company v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-33 nn.15-19, 21-22 (1982), also cited to numer-
ous NLRA cases in explaining Title VII's mitigation of damages provision.
However, Ford Motor Co. suggests that the original source of Titie VII's "reasonable diligence"
language is common law principles of mitigation. Id. at 231 n.15 (citing C. McCoRmiuac, Law OF
DAMAGES 127-58 (1935) (describing general mitigation rule)). The Court also stated, "This duty,
rooted in an ancient principle of law, requires the claimant to use reasonable diligence in finding
other suitable employment." Id. at 231. Professor Sunstein concluded that Title VII's mitigation
language is based above all on common law principles. SUNSrEIN, supra note 1, at 208-09.
150 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941). As discussed earlier, much of Title VII's remedial provisions
were drawn from the NLRA, 110 CONG. REc. 3044 (1964). Professor Kotkin has written that Title
VII was designed to be more favorable to plaintiffs than the NLRA as Tide VII was supposed to
eliminate discrimination whereas the NLRA was supposed to reconcile the competing interests of
unions and management. Kotkin, supra note 99, at 1317-18. As numerous scholars have also
pointed out, however, Title VII's mitigation obligations still leave many employment discrimina-
tion victims without full compensation. E.g., id.; SUNSTrEIN, supra note 1, at 201-07.
151 Phelps, 313 U.S. at 199-200 (emphasis added).
152 Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231 n.15. Many NLRB cases other than those listed in foomotes
15-19 and 21-22 of Ford Motor Co. use mitigation principles. See, e.g., W.C. Nabors v. NLRB, 323
F.2d 686, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964); NLRB v. Armstrong Tire &
Rubber Co., 263 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1959).
153 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES (2d ed. 1993).
154 Id. at 382. He elaborates by stating, "What is important is whether the plaintiff did earn
money or could reasonably have done so. If he didn't and couldn't then the fact that he spent
the dreary days of unemployment watching soap operas does not really seem relevant at all." Id.
at 222 n.100. The federal courts have adopted this standard in many employment discrimination
cases. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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tially different employment, or a much lower salary, or a humiliating or
demeaning position. 155
Thus, the legislative foundations of Title ViI's reasonable diligence require-
ment (the NLRA and common-law mitigation principles) support giving
the requirement a flexible interpretation. 156
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 buttresses this
conclusion. The House Judiciary Committee Report on the Act shows that
the Act was written to "strengthen civil rights laws that ban discrimination
in employment."'1 57 It was crafted to overturn a series of 1990 U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that "cut back dramatically on the scope and ef-
fectiveness of civil rights protections .... and to strengthen existing remedies,
to provide more effective deterrence and ensure compensation."'158
Title VII's legislative history shows that it was also designed to en-
courage the private resolution of discrimination complaints or settlement
at the administrative stage.' 59 Moreover, one provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 was aimed at ensuring the finality of discrimination consent
decree settlements by prohibiting certain members of racial groups who
might be burdened by their provisions from challenging them.1 60 Yet, this
congressional endorsement of settlement finality cannot reasonably be in-
terpreted as showing that Congress wanted unwilling plaintiffs to resolve
problems internally rather than seek a trial. Such a result would defeat the
155 DOBBS, supra note 153, at 382.
156 State employment contract cases contemporaneous with Title VII's consideration and pas-
sage also support this flexible conception of common law mitigation of damage principles. See,
e.g., Schiller v. Keuffel & Esser Co., 124 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Wis. 1963); Asbell Bros., Inc. v. Nash-
Davis Mach. Co., 382 P.2d 57, 59 (Wyo. 1963). The Supreme Court has used contemporaneous
understandings of statutory terms to determine the meaning of those terms on several occasions.
See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 613 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congre-
gation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987). Many mitigation cases in the early 1950s and 1960s are
cited in 15 AM. JUR., Damages § 28, at 424 (1938).
157 H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C-A.N. 549,
549.
158 Id. at 556 (emphasis added). The cases that hurt civil rights plaintiffs included: Independ-
ent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (limiting attorney fee awards to civil
rights plaintiffs); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (prohibiting the use of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 to challenge discriminatory discharges or racial harassment); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (stringently interpreting Title VII statute of limitations, mak-
ing it impossible to attack most seniority systems as discriminatory); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989) (ruling that reverse discrimination suits could be brought challenging consent decrees
despite the doctrine ordinarily precluding collateral attacks); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) (effectively shifting the burden of proof to plaintiffs in disparate impact
employment discrimination cases).
159 A Senate Judiciary Committee Report on a precursor to Title VII states that "the measure
speaks on the problem solving level with primary reliance placed on voluntary and local solu-
tions. Only when these efforts break down would the residual right of enforcement come into
play." S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2356.
See also H. R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.CA.N. 2355,
2393. This House Report section was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1979). Many other sources of authority exist on this point as well.
See, e.g., 110 CONG. Rzc. 15,893 (1964) (statement of Rep. MacGregor on Civil Rights Act of 1964)
("When we drafted this bill we excluded these issues largely because problems raised by these
controversial questions are more properly handled at a government level closer to the American
people and by communities and individuals themselves."), quoted in Local Number 93 v. City of Cleve-
land, 478 U.S. 501, 520 (1986) (emphasis added).
160 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (1) (Supp. V 1993). Congress overturned the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). See supra note 158.
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twin substantive aims of Title VII, which are reflected in the 1991 Act's
legislative history-stopping discrimination and making victims whole. 161
D. The Textualist Approach
Textualists argue that the only legitimate method available to courts
for deciding what a statute means is to look at the statute's text.162 Judge
Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and
Professor Frederick Schauer are leading proponents of this methodol-
ogy.163 While there are many vociferous critics,' 64 the U.S. Supreme Court
has said on several recent occasions that the plain meaning of the text is
controlling, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary.165
Although Title VII's text does not address the precise issue addressed
in this Article, it also does not support a restrictive view of remedies. 166
Section 706(g) (1) of Title VII states that "[i]nterim earnings or amounts
eamable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated
against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable."' 67 This
language imposes a duty on the employee only to act reasonably and pro-
vides that a failure to do so will reduce the employee's award. It does not
state that the employee must remain with the discriminatory company to
recover back pay.168
161 H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 552. See supra note 109.
162 Sunstein, supra note 98, at 415-16.
163 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HAgv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 59, 60 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interrtation and the Power of theJudicia y, 7
HAR.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REx. 538
(1988); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning
1990 Sup. CT. REv,. 231. Relevant to the title of this Article, Professor Schauer comments that
"[t]he Justices have not been reading their Derrida." Id.
164 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 113-23; Greenberger, supra note 96, at 57; Reynolds, supra note
98, at 935. One of the most common observations about textualism is that it fulfills a particular
vision of the separation of powers in which courts are clearly subordinate to legislatures because
courts using such an approach will not extend "a statute beyond its uncontroversial meaning
unless Congress has made that determination in the statute." Greenberger, supra note 96, at 60.
See also SUNSTIN, supra note 1, at 122 ("Although textualism properly draws on the democratic
primacy of the legislature, in some cases legislative instructions, taken in context, are unclear and
the claim of command is a myth.").
165 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 869 (1991); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 838 (1990). Several Justices have suggested that textualism must be the
primary methodology used in construing statutes. Greenberger, supra note 96, at 55. But see
Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976) (stating that no matter
how clear the statute's language, aids to construction may be used).
166 Several scholars have acknowledged that Title VII's broad prohibitions are subject to nu-
merous interpretations and require courts to fill in the textual gaps by using background norms.
SUNSTIN, supra note 1, at 118; Neuborne, supra note 96, at 726.
167 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
168 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the constructive discharge standard by using
this kind of textual analysis in a case involving Wisconsin's Family Leave Act. The issue was
whether a plaintiffs right to back pay should be cut off after she resigned due to having been
illegally given an inferiorjob after returning from leave. The court said that the back pay contin-
ued running and pointed out that: "The FMIA does not state that a constructive discharge is a
requirement for reinstatement or back pay. Kelley Company cites nothing from the legislative
history indicating that a constructive discharge is a prerequisite to reinstatement or an award of
back pay." Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 493 N.W.2d 68, 78 (Wis. 1992) (emphasis added). This rea-
soning applies also to Title VII.
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E. The Public Values Methodology
Professors William Eskridge and Cass Sunstein, as well as other schol-
ars, have proposed that courts interpret statutes by using substantive back-
ground norms, referred to as the new maxims or new canons. 169 These
scholars reason that virtually all current statutory interpretation turns on
subjective judicial preferences. Thus, they have proposed that judges ac-
knowledge this subjectivity and agree to employ certain generally accepted
rules designed to remedy the flaws in our regulatory state. The norms that
they promulgate derive from several sources, including "the constitutional
structure and ... the fabric of modern public law; [the need to] improve
rather than impair the operation of government institutions; and [the
need to employ a] conception of politics that is likely, if adopted, to com-
bat pathologies in regulatory practice." °70 Among the norms recognized by
the public values methodology, two are relevant to the issue of Title VII
remedies.171
Professors Eskridge and Sunstein agree that "courts should generously
construe statutes designed to protect traditionally disadvantaged
groups."17 2 Such groups encompass those protected by Title VII. None-
theless, public values methodology also recognizes the "competing princi-
ple of employer autonomy." As Professor Sunstein argues, however, the
courts should treat this employer norm as subservient to the goal of pro-
tecting disadvantaged groups.'73 The norm regarding minorities is more
important because it fills a large hole in our regulatory coverage. Under
this reasoning, courts should reject the constructive discharge approach
because that approach mistakenly favors discriminatory employers over dis-
crimination victims.
V. USING MITIGATION STANDARDS TO DETERMINE WHEN BACK PAY OF
DISCRIMINATION VICTIMS SHOULD BE CUT OFF
Most federal courts that have rejected the constructive discharge ap-
proach use a mitigation test that looks at the "reasonableness" of the em-
ployee's resignation decision. Although this standard appears vague,
courts focus on two factors in these mitigation cases: whether the plaintiff
was still experiencing the substantial effects of discrimination at the time
she resigned and whether she resigned to search diligently for another job.
This section proposes that courts decide whether a discrimination victim's
resignation tolls her back pay by balancing these two factors. The worse
the discrimination or the greater the mitigative effort, the more freedom
the plaintiff should have to resign. This balancing test properly accommo-
169 Professor Reynolds describes these scholars as the "new maximists." Reynolds, supra note
98, at 937; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1007 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 98, at 405.
170 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 147.
171 Id. at 162.
172 Id. at 170-71, 179 (emphasis added); see also Eskridge, supra note 169, at 1032 (advocating
as a third special rule of statutory interpretation the protection of "Carolene Groups").
173 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 183.
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dates the discrimination victim's right to escape discrimination and the em-
ployer's right to be protected from employees seeking a windfall.
A. The Two Main Factors
Although courts that follow the mitigation approach use many factors
to determine whether a plaintiff's resignation was reasonable,17 4 the two
central factors are the continuing impact of the discrimination by the em-
ployer, and the mitigative effort made by the employee. Several cases em-
phasize the continuing effects of discrimination. In Wells v. North Carolina
Board of Alcoholic Control,'75 for instance, the plaintiff had been discrimina-
torily denied a promotion to a sales clerk position and had remained a
stock clerk. The plaintiff had then resigned because the stock clerk posi-
tion involved lifting which resulted in back problems. The Fourth Circuit
granted an award of back pay accruing from the date of his resignation and
reasoned that, "had he not been wrongfully denied that promotion to rela-
tively light work, it may reasonably be inferred that he would not have suf-
fered an injury to his back or that any back problem would have been less
severe."176
In Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,' 77 the Northern District of Illi-
nois permitted an age discrimination victim to continue receiving back pay
after resigning because his resignation had been proximately caused by his
discriminatory demotion from Branch Manager to the position of sales-
man. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's resignation was not "an unrea-
sonable failure to mitigate his damages" 78 since he was not obliged to
remain in the illegal placement. 79
174 These factors include: (1) the amount of discrimination that plaintiff was experiencing;
(2) the causal nexus between plaintiff's resignation and the discrimination plaintiff experienced;
(3) whether plaintiff's resignation was motivated by a good faith desire to more fully search for
employment equivalent to what plaintiff would have had absent discrimination; (4) whether the
plaintiff actively searched for comparable employment after resigning;, (5) whether the plaintiff
found such employment; (6) whether the plaintiff could have reasonably expected to have seen
the employer correct its discrimination by remaining; and (7) ensuring that incentives for dis-
crimination victims to leave and seek promising new jobs are not defeated.
175 714 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
176 The court elaborated:
We think the back pay award was proper whether or not Wells was constructively dis-
charged. It is now undisputed that the defendant wrongfully refused to promote Wells
in August, 1974 to a position of Sales Clerk .... There was testimony indicating that the
back injury was a result of strain from lifting .... Wells reasonably ended his employ-
ment for reasons beyond his control, reasons which were causally linked to the defend-
ant's wrongful denial of a promotion.
Id. at 342.
177 454 F. Supp. 78, 81 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
178 Id.
179 The court also stated:
In this case, however, it was not necessary to show that defendant had constructively
discharged plaintiff from his position as a salesman in order to establish liability under
the ADEA, because defendant had concededly removed plaintiff from his job as Branch
Manager. This removal would in itself establish a violation of the ADEA, if, as the jury
found, it were motivated by age, and would leave only the proper measure of damages.
Id. at 81.
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In Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Center,80 the Southern District of New
York granted an award of back pay to an employee who had resigned after
his employer discriminatorily denied him a promotion to the position of
radiation therapy director. The court found that the position was unique
and that the plaintiff would have suffered permanent discrimination if he
had remained at the medical center.1 8 1 This showed that "the harm to
Nobler was irremediable."' 8 2
Other courts have looked mainly at the plaintiff's job search efforts in
assessing reasonableness rather than at the continuing effects of the dis-
crimination. In Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., the Fourth Circuit stated that
the plaintiffs back pay should not be tolled because "consistent with his
obligation to mitigate damages, plaintiff sought and obtained a better pay-
ingjob."'8 3 The Eighth Circuit in Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce ruled that
plaintiff's resignation was part of a reasonable and good faith effort to
achieve a comparable position and therefore was "based on mitigative mo-
tives."' 84 The Ninth Circuit in Thorne v. City of El Segundo stated that the
"plaintiff had mitigated her damages by actively seeking employment fol-
lowing her resignation from the job with the discriminatory employer."' 8 5
In addition, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia refused to
cut off a plaintiffs back pay, after she quit as a result of discrimination,
because of her subsequent success in obtaining equivalent employment
and advancements.18 6
As these cases demonstrate, courts following the mitigation position
generally have emphasized either the degree of ongoing discrimination
that the plaintiff experienced, or the diligence of plaintiffs job search ef-
fort in determining whether the plaintiffs actions were reasonable. Identi-
180 715 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
181 Id. at 572.
182 Id. In Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1991), rev'd
on other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993), the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania examined whether a female law firm associate, who
was discriminatorily denied a partnership, was entitled to back pay after resigning. The court
described the issue as whether the plaintiff's "decision to resign was reasonable under the circum-
stances for purposes of determining the appropriate Tide VII relief for the period after her resig-
nation." Id. at 312. The court found the plaintiff's resignation to be reasonable, and refused to
cut off her back pay, by ruling "that her career at the Firm would be limited to a much greater
extent than she could reasonably accept." Id. The irremediable nature of the discriminatory
injury meant that the plaintiffwas free to resign and still get back pay. Id. at 311-12. The Third
Circuit later reversed the district court's ruling that the firm discriminated against the plaintiff
when it rejected her for partnership. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509,
538 (3d Cir. 1992). This decision, however, did not question the lower court's reasoning on the
back pay termination issue. See also Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir.
1986).
183 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
184 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978). See also Daines v. City of Mankato, 754 F. Supp. 681, 702
(D. Minn. 1990) (quoting Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978)).
185 Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 1986). Thorneis technically a
refusal to hire case and its mitigation rationale derives from that factual context. Although its
factual context may limit its relevance, its resemblance to a promotion denial case makes it rele-
vant, as does its discussion of plaintiff's "resignation." Thorne, however, does suggest that con-
structive discharge principles should apply in many situations where the employee who was
denied a promotion might still succeed at being able to advance at a later time. Id. at 1134-35.
186 Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1986).
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fying these factors, however, is only the first step in the analysis. The next,
and more difficult, question is how courts should balance these factors.
B. Background on Balancing Tests
Judges use balancing tests to resolve conflicting interests.187 Courts
may weigh one interest against another or strike a balance between several
interests.' 88 Courts can engage in ad hoc balancing or definitional balanc-
ing.'8 9 Ad hoc balancing means that a court must balance certain factors
anew each time an issue comes up. Definitional balancing means that
courts have agreed to a test that can be applied in virtually all cases, but the
test is the result of a determination as to how competing interests should
be balanced. 190 Courts frequently use balancing tests in employment dis-
crimination cases and in determining mitigation issues.
In the employment discrimination context, courts frequently weigh
the interests of the employer against those of the employee. Last term, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publish-
ing Co.191 reversed a Sixth Circuit decision that had allowed an employer to
use after-acquired evidence of an employee's misconduct as a defense to
liability for an otherwise discriminatory discharge. The Court stated, how-
ever, that such after-acquired evidence was not irrelevant since it could jus-
tify limiting or cutting off a plaintiff's right to recover damages past the
date that the evidence was discovered. The Court said that its ruling was
based on the need to "recognize the duality between the legitimate interests
of the employer and the important claims of the employee."' 92 One com-
187 In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the Supreme Court addressed whether an
attorney work product immunity from discovery exists. The Court acknowledged that parties
seeking discovery have an interest in "reasonable and necessary inquiries" while also confirming
that attorneys have an interest in precluding "unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a man's
work." Id. at 497. The Court then stated, "Properly to balance these competing interests is a
delicate and difficult task." Id. (emphasis added).
188 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 946
(1987).
189 Id. at 948.
190 Id.
191 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), rev' 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993). The Sixth Circuit ruled that the
defendant's discrimination was excused by plaintiff's illegal conduct in copying confidential em-
ployer documents before she was fired. The Supreme Court rejected that approach and instead
adopted a more pro-employee approach, as the text states. The Seventh Circuit had occupied the
middle ground, stating that after-acquired evidence should terminate a plaintiff's right to back
pay as of the date that the evidence is discovered. Smith v. General Scanning Inc., 876 F.2d 1315,
1319 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989). The Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, had ruled that after-acquired evi-
dence could be used only to limit the damages that an employer owes in limited circumstances.
Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992). Moreover, in Wa!/ace the Eleventh
Circuit said that the employer must show that it would have discovered the evidence even if it had
not fired the plaintiff. Id. at 1182. The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning parallels the reasoning be-
hind this Article and has distinct similarities to the approach taken by the Court in McKennon.
The Eleventh Circuit stressed that the opposing rules "invite employers to establish ludicrously
low thresholds for 'legitimate' termination" and helps employers to "sandbag" an employee. Wal-
lam, 968 F.2d at 1180-81.
192 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886 (emphasis added).
Prior to the ruling, scholars said that the Court should "balance the goal of remedying the
discrimination against the public's interest in not condoning the employee's misconduct." Babb,
supra note 127, at 1975. They stressed that "no undue windfall [should accrue] to either the
employer or the employee by allowing them to escape unscathed by their respective unsavory
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mentator has suggested that the best way "to lessen the conflict in this area
of the law" between the competing employee and employer interests would
be for courts to use "mitigation principles" more broadly. 193
Courts also must balance an injured party's general duty to mitigate
against that party's particular circumstances. For example, a party need
not mitigate damages when to do so would be very costly, or when that
party has "a want of sufficient funds."194 A party's duty to mitigate there-
fore will vary depending on the burden involved.
C. Application of the Balancing Test
The above cases and principles lead to the conclusion that courts
should take account of the legitimate interests of employers and employees
by balancing the amount of ongoing discrimination that is experienced by
the employee who resigns with the diligence of the employee's job search.
Courts should rule in particular that "substantial discrimination" justifies
an employee's resignation even if the employee does not aggressively pur-
sue job opportunities. Courts should further rule that "diligent mitigative
effort" justifies a resignation even if the continuing discrimination is not
too severe. This balancing test is consistent with case law that reduces the
employee's duty to mitigate and seek equivalent jobs when to do so would
be unduly burdensome (e.g., due to substantial ongoing discrimination).
The remaining issue is how courts should apply this test.
In applying the balancing test, courts must first distinguish between
substantial discrimination and "insubstantial" discrimination. Substantial
discrimination exists when an employer has discriminatorily demoted an
employee to a position that pays much less than the employee's original
actions." Id. at 1976; see also Richard G. Steele, Comment, Rethinking the After-Acquired Evidence
Defense in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 46 HAsTINGS LJ. 243, 277 (1994) ("In order to balance
these competing considerations in the after-acquired evidence context, courts should provide a
carefully tailored remedy for the discrimination suffered by an employee, but they should not
compensate the employee for the loss of ajob which was undeserved in the first place.") (empha-
sis added); id. at 284 ("A more balanced approach to the after-acquired evidence problem evalu-
ates the underlying policy of Title VII in light of the employer's right to insist upon integrity in
the work force and the equitable notion that a deceitful employee should not receive a windfall.")
(emphasis added).
Numerous other Title VII cases require courts to balance competing interests. See, e.g.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (noting that courts in sex discrimination cases may
have to determine whether an employer's exclusion of women is justified as a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification based on a weighing of the employer's need for men versus the interest of
women in not being excluded);Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 728 (5th Cir. 1986) (observ-
ing that the federal courts in retaliation cases "have required that the employee conduct be rea-
sonable in light of the circumstances, and have held that the employer's right to run his business
must be balanced against the rights of the employee to express his grievances and promote his
own welfare") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).
193 Babb, supra note 127, at 1976 (citing Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge Miscon-
duct Discovered After an Employee's Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 SuraoLK U. L.
REv. 1, 28 (1990)).
194 15 AM.JUR. Damages, § 29 at 425 (1938); see, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Amicon Fruit Co.,
269 F. 559 (4th Cir. 1920) (holding that a property owner does not have to make expenditures to
protect his property when their cost would be considerable given the possible injury); Yazoo &
M.V.R. Co. v. Sultan, 63 So. 672 (Miss. 1913). In addition, an injured party must mitigate dam-
ages if he can at "trifling expense." 15 AM. JuR. Damages § 29, at 425 (1938).
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position, or that is dramatically inferior in other ways such as prestige.' 95 A
demotion from lawyer to clerical employee qualifies, but a salesperson's
demotion from level six to level five may not. Likewise, the discriminatory
denial of a law partner position to a law firm associate seeking a promotion
would be substantial, 96 whereas denying a full law partner the chance to
be managing partner probably would not' 9 7 A finding of insubstantial dis-
crimination would be justified when a discrimination victim had quit with-
out asking her employer to change its discriminatory decision, especially
when the employer would have done so if requested.' 9 8
Courts must then determine what constitutes a diligent job search.
Obviously, employees who quit so they can lounge at home would not be
searching diligently. 99 Where courts should draw the line is less obvious.
Many courts have taken a hard line on mitigation and have required plain-
tiffs to pursue comparable job opportunities aggressively by, for example,
submitting resumes door to door, filling out numerous job applications,
and registering at employment clearinghouses. 20 0 These hard line deci-
sions, rather than the more lenient ones, should be the basis for determin-
ing whether employees carried out diligent mitigation efforts when they
were not experiencing substantial discrimination. 201 Otherwise, employees
could continue living off their former employers despite making little or
no effort to get another job. Moreover, there is nothing unduly burden-
some about requiring a person to look diligently for ajob. A more lenient
approach to job search efforts, however, would be appropriate where the
employee resigned to escape severe ongoing distribution.
Cases in which the discrimination was barely substantial, but where the
employee made little or no effort to seek otherjobs after quitting, will pres-
ent a tough issue. Because one of the two factors permitting resignation is
present in such cases, courts generally should award full back pay to the
plaintiff. This result follows the principle that courts should resolve doubts
against the wrongdoer when deciding whether to award back pay in em-
ployment discrimination cases.20 2 Because it permits the victim to escape
discrimination without being penalized, this result also fulfills Title VII's
purposes of deterring discrimination and making the plaintiff whole.
This proposed balancing test has the significant advantage of being
"definitional" rather than ad hoc because it specifies the two factors that
are to be weighed against each other. The test therefore has substantial
predictability. The illustrations provided above help to clarify how these
195 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) (listing indicia of inferior positions).
196 See supra note 91, citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr, & Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 310
(E.D. Pa. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88
(1993); see also Kende, supra note 134, at 37 n.79, 71-74.
197 Cf Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977) (holding
that partner who was not allowed to manage Washington, D.C. office had not been ousted).
198 The Americans with Disabilities Act requires employees to seek a reasonable accommoda-
tion, and to be turned down, before an employer can be liable. SeeS. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 34-36 (1989).
199 See supra note 16.
200 See supra note 43.
201 The lenient cases are discussed supra note 42.
202 See Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 628 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984).
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factors should be weighed. Only case-law developments can further clarify
the ambiguities inherent in trying to apply these legal factors to the unfore-
seeable factual situations that may arise. Although these ambiguities make
the test appear somewhat ad hoc, it remains definitional because courts will
be guided by these two factors, which provide a level of certainty beyond
the vague reasonableness test used in most mitigation cases.
D. Potential Objections to the Proposed Mitigation Balancing Test
This two part mitigation test for determining when a court should
award a discrimination victim full back pay better fulfills Title VII's goals
than does the constructive discharge approach. Rather than giving undue
weight to the interests of the employer, it weighs these interests against the
legitimate interests of the employee. The three major criticisms of the pro-
posed balancing test are likely to be that it is vague, that it will permit plain-
tiffs to obtain a windfall, and that it will make employees the judges in their
own causes. As the following examination reveals, none of these criticisms
significantly undermines the proposed test.
1. The Vagueness Argument
A recurring criticism of balancing tests is that they are vague and leave
judges with excessive discretion to evaluate the relevant factors.203
Presented with identical facts, two different judges can arrive at different
results. Critics of this approach prefer rules that supposedly reduce judges'
subjectivity, such as the rigid constructive discharge approach.20 4 These
critics, however, exaggerate the subjectivity of balancing tests and ignore
the subjectivity of more "categorical" approaches.
The balancing test proposed in this Article is largely a definitional test
that specifies how courts should balance the amount of ongoing discrimi-
nation that the plaintiff experienced with the mitigative effort made.20 5 It
is not, for the most part, an ad hoc approach. 206 Because the test estab-
lishes balancing rules for courts to follow, it removes much of the subjectiv-
ity inherent in the reasonableness standard that most courts use to govern
mitigation issues.207
Moreover, the constructive discharge test is no less subjective than the
proposed balancing test. The constructive discharge test requires courts to
determine whether the plaintiff was faced with such intolerable circum-
203 Aleinikoff, supra note 188, at 973-75.
204 Id.; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CM. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
205 See Aleinikoff, supra note 188, at 948.
206 See id.
207 Professor Aleinikoff states that "ad hoc balancing may undermine the development of
stable, knowable principles of law." Id. at 948. It undercuts these principles because there is little
predictability from such an ad hoc approach. The proposed test removes the subjectivity by
clearly instructing courts as to how to carry out the balancing. But see id. at 979 (arguing that
definitional balancing appears at first glance to be a "panacea," but closer examination reveals
that it is not because the definition must be adjusted to account for unforeseen interests).
Nonetheless, the balancing test proposed here is consistent with the principles that underlie
the reasonableness criteria of mitigation. See id. at 992 ("The balancing drum beats the rhythm of
reasonableness, and we march to it because the cadence seems so familiar, so sensible."). It is
simply more specific.
[Vol. 71:1
DECONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
stances that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign.2 08
On this matter, two judges easily could disagree.20 9 Indeed, this supposed
rule-based inquiry actually involves a great deal of balancing as courts must
assess all aspects of the plaintiffs employment situation (such as salary,
prestige, and hours) and weigh them to decide if t6gether they present an
intolerable situation. Like most rule-based critiques of balancing, the argu-
ment ignores how rule categorization itself depends on balancing.2 10
2. The Windfall Argument
Another objection to the proposed balancing test is that it will permit
an employee who is discriminatorily demoted to resign and then to receive
as much back pay as an employee who is discriminatorily discharged, even
though the employer's conduct in the former case is less damaging. Thus,
the illegally demoted employee can reap a windfall by being lazy and quit-
ting. Support for this argument comes from case law, which states that the
purpose of the mitigation rule is to encourage employees to continue
working.2 "
This objection ignores the specifics of the mitigation test developed
here. The test ensures that employees who resign must show either that
they were suffering substantial ongoing discrimination or that they made a
diligent effort to obtain suitable employment. These criteria eliminate the
possibility that an employee can simply depart without reason and remain
lazily at home with hopes of profiting.
The windfall argument also makes several doubtful assumptions. First,
even if one assumes that employees will prevail in a fiercely litigated law-
suit, this argument ignores that employees can almost never afford to quit
because they have families to feed and clothe in the interim.212 Moreover,
the assumption that they will prevail is questionable because most employ-
208 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 11. Compare Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071,
1077 (5th Cir. 1981) (ruling that ordinary adverse discriminatory action by employer is not
enough for a constructive discharge) with Schafer v. Board of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 250 (3d
Cir. 1990) (stating that aggravated circumstances are not needed for a constructive discharge
under the facts presented).
210 Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance Between the Citizen
and the Perfectionist State, 45 HASTNGS L.J. 969, 973 (1994) ("[T]he discussion about whether the
balancing or the categorical approach is better to adjudicate disputes... reflects a false dichot-
omy."). Professor Sheppard's article provides an excellent summary of the critics and supporters
of balancing tests.
211 See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 n.12 (1982).
212 One scholar stated:
Employees have no choice but to seek other work, not only because of the legal rule
requiring mitigation of damages, but more compellingly because of their need to sup-
port themselves and their families until back pay is actually paid. Once the employee
finds other work, there is little incentive for the employer to settle.
Summers, supra note 25, at 478; see also Valdez v. City of Los Angeles, 282 Cal. Rptr. 726, 735 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) ("Financial circumstances may not allow the employee the luxury of resigning
before finding other employment.").
In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), the dissent stated that one cannot
assume that employees will file risky lawsuits in the hopes of winning a big verdict and not having
to look for work because:
that attributes to the employee an omniscience frequently not given to members of the
legal profession [regarding the likely result of the lawsuit] .... This is not all. He must
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ees who wish to sue for wrongful discharge are unable to find lawyers.
213
Even if they obtain legal representation, they usually are unable to recover
fully.21 4 Finally, this objection paints American workers as lazy and eager to
defraud their employers, an assumption for which there is little support.
215
have capital sufficient to provide for himself and for any dependents while he awaits the
back pay award, even though that may not come until several years later.
Id. at 207 (Murphy, J., dissenting in part).
Additionally, the plaintiff must pay the costs of the lawsuit, regardless of its outcome. The
plaintiff's lawyer may advance, but not ultimately assume, litigation costs. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(d) (1990):
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a
lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to the client, except that a
lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including, but not limited
to, court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of
obtaining and presenting evidence if ... the client remains ultimately liable for such
expenses ....
Id.
213 Litigation costs, for example, make wrongful dismissal remedies virtually unavailable to 
all
but middle and upper income employees. Indeed, "even if the dismissal is clearly wrongful and
success in litigation certain, the lawyer may not be able to afford to take the case on contingency,
if the employer is likely to force the case to trial." Summers, supra note 25, at 467. Middle class
Americans will struggle even more to find a lawyer if legislation passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives that requires losers to pay the winner's costs and attorney fees in certain lawsuits 
be-
comes law. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, House Approves Measure to Limit Federal Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,
March 8, 1995, at Al.
214 Various studies demonstrate that most plaintiffs who wish to bring successful discrimina-
tion lawsuits against their employers find the going very rough. An authoritative law review arti-
cle demonstrates that "most wrongfully discharged employees obtained modest or 
wholly
inadequate awards, even in California, where the substantive legal rules ma[k]e tort remedies
available in most cases" and that "there is a wide disparity in the amount recovered by discharged
employees, which often bears little relation to economic loss." Summers, supra note 25, at 466; see
also Kopkin, supra note 99.
In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress made an express legislative finding that
Title VII and other civil rights statutes provide inadequate remedies for discrimination victims.
See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.N.
549, 556 ("Section 2 of the legislation also sets forth Congress' [sic] dual purposes: to respond to
the Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that were so dramatically
limited and to.. . ensure compensation commensurate with the harms suffered. . . ."). See gener-
ally Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict Between the
Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1993). A newspaper
editorial written by the publisher of the New York Jury Verdict Reporter recently suggested that
verdicts are on a downward trend. Russell F. Moran, Juries are Just Saying No, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 
16,
1995, at A17 (reporting that from 1988 to 1994, New York product liability defendants won 62%
ofjury verdicts whereas they only won 51% of these verdicts from 1981 to 1987). A Supreme
Court decision striking down fee multipliers has also contributed to the bleak situation facing
discrimination plaintiffs and was not cured by the 1991 Act. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 
S.
Ct. 2638 (1992).
215 I assumed that employers will act illegally when I stated that employers may wish to keep
employees in inferior positions to wear them down and get them to quit. Yet the employers
discussed in this Article are employers that have already been found guilty of discrimination since
this Article is simply addressing a remedies issue. To assume that an employer who has already
been found to have discriminated would discriminate again is hardly unrealistic.
In contrast, there is no justification for assuming that most employees are criminals at heart
who are just waiting for the right opportunity to defraud their employer. Cf Douglas C. Harper,
Spotlight Abuse-Save Profits, 79 INDUS. DISTRIBUTION, Oct. 1990, at 47, 51 ("According to Childs
from the National Business Crime Network, despite the growing incidence of employee business
abuse, most employees are honest and are willing to take an active role in preventing crime.");
Allen Fishman, Employee Theft Can Steal Jobs, Destroy Business, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, Dec. 9,
1991, Bus. Plus Sec., at 18 ("Most employees are honest and will work to keep theft down if they
are aware of how it can affect job security and pay."); Renee Haines, FBI: 500,000 Fudge Facts on
Their Resumes, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1lA (A congressional study estimates that one-
third of all job applicants commits resume fraud.); Ellyn Toney, When Workers Steal, BATON ROUGE
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3. The "Judge In Your Own Cause" Argument
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit raised an additional
concern, reasoning that allowing discrimination victims to continue getting
back pay after resigning would make victims both the judge and the jury in
their disputes with employers.216 They would be free to decide that their
employers acted illegally and then to receive continuous back pay despite
having abandoned their employers.
This objection reveals the confusion that lies at the heart of the con-
structive discharge approach. Courts following that approach extend a
doctrine for proving liability in employment discrimination cases to the
remedial context. Yet upon close examination, the extension does not
make sense. The concern at the liability stage is that an employee could
recover back pay simply by resigning from a job with an innocent em-
ployer. Such a rule would be a disaster and would improperly make the
employee a judge in her own cause. At the remedial stage, however, the
court has already found the employee to have been discriminatorily de-
moted, denied a promotion, or transferred.217 In such a situation, the em-
ployee is a proven victim, not a judge or jury.
CONCLUSION
Discrimination victims must travel a hard road to receive compensa-
tion for their injury. The road is even more difficult for victims who are
suing their current employers. In most cases, victims can expect long,
costly battles in which the employers seek to defend their conduct and at-
tack the victims' credibility. Employees are often victims of retaliation
when they complain. Given these roadblocks, many employees cannot
even find lawyers willing to take their case. Those who can hire lawyers
often do not recover what they deserve.
Despite these difficulties, many federal and state courts have set up
another roadblock for such employees: to recover full back pay, employees
must remain with the employer who is discriminating against them. Be-
cause of the public policy favoring the internal voluntary resolution of dis-
crimination complaints, an employee is justified in leaving, according to
these courts, only when things have become so horrible that the employee
has been constructively discharged.
This standard should be rejected. As a Wisconsin Supreme Court jus-
tice recently stated:
[S]hould the law require a victim to carry the burden of changing some-
one's or some entity's unlawful behavior?... Do children who are the
victims of incest need to remain with their abusive parents in the hopes
SuNDAY ADVOCATE,Jan. 8,1995, News Section, at 1E ("'Normally, one out of 20 or 30 employees
are probably stealing,' says Sears' Brewer, who leads seminars for area businesses on how to deal
with employee theft.").
216 Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977).
217 Many of the constructive discharge cases like Rosado do not realize the difference in the
two scenarios. They place the burden on the discrimination victim to show constructive dis-
charge when it should be on the defendant to show that the victim's right to back pay has been
terminated.
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that they will be able to cure the abusive behavior? Of course not, and no
one should ever suggest otherwise. The point is that victims should in no
way have the obligation of changing the unlawful behavior of their
assailants.2 18
Courts that use the constructive discharge standard in remedial matters are
acting contrary to Title VII's purposes-to eradicate discrimination and
make its victims whole. Because of this standard, discrimination victims
like Gail Derr may go uncompensated for their injuries. A stringent con-
structive discharge test is simply a sophisticated means of providing unde-
served protection to employers who discriminate.
The federal and state courts should use mitigation principles to deter-
mine whether a plaintiffs right to receive back pay continues after the
plaintiff quits. A two-part test in which courts balance the level of continu-
ing discrimination with the mitigation effort by the plaintiff would fulfill
Title VII's purposes. This test also would provide substance to the general
"reasonableness" standard that has governed court mitigation discussions.
Adoption of this test would therefore be an important step in society's ef-
fort to eliminate discrimination in the workplace.
218 Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Department of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations, 501 N.W.2d
391, 400-01 (Wis. 1993) (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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